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The Jurisdiction Canon
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl*
This Article concerns the interpretationof jurisdictionalstatutes. The
fundamental postulate of the law of the federal courts is that the federal courts
are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction. That principle is reinforced
by a canon of statutory interpretationaccording to which statutes conferring
federal subject-matter jurisdiction are to be construed narrowly, with
ambiguities resolved against the availability of federal jurisdiction. This
interpretive canon is over a century old and has been recited in thousands of
federal cases, but its future has become uncertain. The Supreme Court recently
stated that the canon does not apply to many of today's most important
jurisdictional disputes. The Court's decision is part of a pattern, as several
cases from the last decade have questioned the canon's validity, a surprising
development given what appearedto be the canon's entrenched status.
This state of flux and uncertainty provides an ideal time to assess the
normative merits and the likely future trajectory of the canon requiring
narrow construction of jurisdictionalstatutes. This Article undertakes those
tasks. First, it conducts a normative evaluation of the canon and its potential
justifications. The normative evaluation requires consideration of several
matters, including the canon's historical pedigree, its relationship to
constitutional values and congressional preferences, and its ability to bring
about good social outcomes. Reasonable minds can differ regarding whether
the canon is ultimately justified, but the case for it turns out to be weaker than
most observers would initially suspect. Second, the Article attempts, as a
positive matter, to identify the institutional and political factors that have
contributed to the canon's recent negative trajectory and that can be expected
to shape its future path. These factors include docket composition, interestgroup activity, and the Supreme Court's attitude toward the civil justice
system.
This Article's examination of the jurisdiction canon has broader value
beyond the field of federal jurisdiction because it sheds some incidental light
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on the more general questions of why interpretive rules change, how
methodological changes spread through the judicial hierarchy, and how the
interpretivepractices of the lower courts vary from those of the Supreme Court.
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INTRODUCTION

The cardinal principle of the law of the federal courts is that
the federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction.
Countless cases stand for that principle, including what is perhaps the
most renowned case in all of American law, Marbury v. Madison.1
Although Marbury is famous for its broad pronouncements about the
power of judicial review, the Supreme Court's more specific ruling was
that a federal statute had given the Court a type of jurisdiction that
was not authorized by Article III of the Constitution. 2 Article III
empowers the federal courts to hear only certain categories of
disputes, and, as Marbury reminds us, it provides the first and most
fundamental limitation on federal judicial power. But the Constitution
is not the only constraint. In addition, and much more important as a
matter of daily practice, a federal court's exercise of authority must
comply with the jurisdictional statutes, which usually confer much
less jurisdiction than the Constitution would allow. 3 Thus the federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction twice over.
This Article concerns an important corollary to the limitedjurisdiction principle. That corollary holds that the statutes setting
forth federal subject-matter jurisdiction are to be narrowly construed.4
That is, when the meaning of a jurisdictional statute is ambiguous,
vague, or otherwise uncertain, the courts are to interpret the statute
so as to err on the side of restricting federal judicial authority. This
interpretive rule is one of the established presumptions or

1.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2.
Id. at 173-76.
3.
See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ("Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution
and statute . . . ."). An exception to the rule that jurisdiction requires both a constitutional and a
statutory basis, though not a practically significant exception today, involves the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction. That constitutional grant of authority is regarded as self executing.
See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3525 (3d ed. 2008).

4.
See, e.g., Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ("The policy of the statute [setting
forth a required amount-in-controversy for federal jurisdiction] calls for its strict construction.");
Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 733 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 2013) ("We strictly construe statutes
conferring jurisdiction. . . . [I]f there is ambiguity as to whether the instant statute confers
federal jurisdiction over this case, we are compelled to adopt a reasonable, narrow construction."
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Kresberg v. Int'l Paper Co., 149 F.2d 911, 913
(2d Cir. 1945) ("[T]he well established rule [is] that federal jurisdiction is not to be extended
beyond the scope permitted by a strict construction of the statute upon which it rests."); Surface
Am., Inc. v. United Sur. & Indem. Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 (D.P.R. 2012) ("As courts of
limited jurisdiction, federal courts are bound to construe jurisdictional grants narrowly."); Fed.
Deposit Ins. Co. v. Howse, 802 F. Supp. 1554, 1567 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (referring to "the canon that
a congressional grant of jurisdiction should be read narrowly").
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"substantive canons" governing statutory interpretation. Leading
authorities on federal practice call the narrow-construction canon a
"familiar proposition," and the federal courts recite some version of
this canon in hundreds of rulings every year. 6 That makes it one of the
most frequently cited substantive canons in the federal courts'
interpretive toolkit.7
Despite its seemingly solid footing in the federal courts, the
rule of narrow construction has lately come under threat. Just because
a rule of federal practice has been familiar to courts, litigants, and
commentators for decades, and has been repeated thousands of times,
does not mean it is immune from abrogation. Recall the fate of the
practically sacred language governing dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim: the complaint should not be dismissed, as
generations of lawyers learned, "unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief."8 That formulation, despite its familiarity
to virtually every litigator in the country, was "retired" by the
Supreme Court in 2007 in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 9
If the Supreme Court's treatment of the jurisdiction canon over
the last decade or so is any guide, the canon may be headed for a
similar fate. The canon has not (yet) been forced into retirement, but
5.
See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3602.1, at 135 (3d ed. 2009) ("It is a familiar
proposition that the constitutional policy of limited jurisdiction requires that the statutes
granting subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts be strictly construed."); see also
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1206 (5th ed. 2014) (citing a canon of "[n]arrow
construction of federal court jurisdictional grants that would siphon cases away from state

courts").
6.
It is impossible to give a precise figure, in part because electronic databases do not
include every district court opinion. See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV.
L.J. 515, 519-25 (2016). Nonetheless, one can find hundreds of invocations of the canon in
federal cases by running a search such as "federal /p jurisdiction /s (strict! or narrow!)" in West's
All Federal Cases (ALLFEDS) database. For 2014, this search returns nearly one thousand
results. Many of the results are false positives, but reviewing a sample of the results allows one
to conclude that the number of true hits is in the hundreds. The canon is especially prevalent in
federal decisions involving attempts to remove cases from state court to federal court.
7.
Precise rankings are impossible because of the imprecision of word searches and the
incompleteness of databases. The rule of lenity, probably the other leading contender for most
frequently cited substantive canon, also appears hundreds of times a year in federal decisions.
And unlike the jurisdiction canon, the rule of lenity appears frequently in state cases as well.
State courts only rarely interpret federal jurisdictional statutes, such as when a federal statute
provides for jurisdiction exclusively in the federal courts. Such situations have sometimes led
state courts to cite the narrow-construction canon. E.g., State v. FlV Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245,
1252-53 (Alaska 1984); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Betts, 518 P.2d 385, 387 (Kan. 1974).
8.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
9.
550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007) (stating that the "no set of facts" language had "earned its
retirement" and should be forgotten).
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the Court's December 2014 decision in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating
Co. v. Owens10 counts at least as a demotion to part-time status. The
Court stated in Dart Cherokee that the narrow-interpretation canon
does not apply in cases involving removal to federal court under the
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), which is the most important new
jurisdictional statute of this century." Had the Court stopped there,
its ruling would have been significant but not especially surprising, for
CAFA's purpose was to expand jurisdiction, and, as the Court
explained, Congress apparently wanted the new jurisdictional
provisions to be interpreted generously.1 2 But the Court did not stop
there. Rather, the Court also referred, ominously, to the presumption
against federal jurisdictional in its more general form as merely a
"purported" rule whose very existence was up for grabs. 13 Though less
explicit than Dart Cherokee, other Supreme Court cases from roughly
the last decade have also cast doubt on the jurisdiction canon's
validity, and not only in CAFA cases. 14 Perhaps the canon has enough
history and inertia behind it to survive, albeit in a diminished state,
but this moment of flux provides an opportunity to study the
jurisdiction canon in a comprehensive way.
This Article undertakes that comprehensive study by assessing
the jurisdiction canon both normatively and descriptively. The
normative analysis will consider whether the canon is justified and, if
it is, on what grounds. This requires examination of several kinds of
possible justifications, including those rooted in history, policy,
constitutional values, and congressional intent. The normative
evaluation shows that the case for the jurisdiction canon is shakier
than one might guess given the canon's familiarity. Because the case
for the jurisdiction canon is close and contestable, whether the canon
is justified may depend on how highly one values stability and,
concomitantly, how heavy a burden one puts on proponents of change.
The descriptive analysis will seek to explain what has put the
canon under threat in recent times and, tentatively, to predict its
future trajectory. The canon has faced some headwinds lately: recent
congressional activity has mostly favored expanded federal
jurisdiction, and influential business groups have campaigned against
the canon in an effort to increase their access to the federal courts. At
10.

135 S. Ct. 547 (2014).
See id. at 554; see also infra Sections II.C, III.C (discussing CAFA's goals and
significance).
12. See 135 S. Ct. at 554.
13. See id.
14. See infra Section II.A.1.b (discussing Supreme Court cases that questioned or neglected
the narrow-construction canon).

11.

504

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:2:499

the same time, the canon will likely retain a base of support in the
lower courts due to its familiarity and its tendency to serve those
courts' interests in reducing caseloads. One difficulty in predicting the
canon's future at this particular moment is that debates over access to
the civil litigation system are quite politicized, perhaps increasingly
so. The jurisdiction canon may have become a topic, like abortion and
affirmative action, regarding which the political commitments of new
Justices can make a difference.
This Article aims to yield at least two types of payoffs. First,
comprehensive study of one of the most frequently cited substantive
canons is useful in its own right, especially when the canon is in a
period of uncertainty and potential reevaluation. Indeed, this canon
would particularly benefit from study because, as a canon used mostly
by the lower courts, it tends to escape the notice of Supreme Courtoriented scholarship (i.e., most statutory interpretation scholarship).1 5
Second, the discussion sheds light on some broader debates in
statutory interpretation, such as whether the canons are binding
"law," 16 why interpretive rules emerge and evolve,17 and how changes
in interpretive methodology spread through a judicial hierarchy
composed of courts with somewhat differing roles and interests.18
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth addressing a
source of skepticism about the canons generally. Although the various
canons and maxims of interpretation are constantly invoked by courts,
there is the nagging worry that these purported rules-like other
rhetoric found in judicial opinions but to an even greater degree-are
mere post hoc rationalizations for decisions that were actually reached
15. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How To Read a Statute in a
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 436-38 (2012) (explaining that scholarship in the field of
statutory interpretation has traditionally focused almost entirely on the U.S. Supreme Court).
16. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law"
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1907-18, 1968-90 (2011) (discussing the nature of
interpretive methodology); see also infra Section II.A.2 (explaining that lower courts treat the
jurisdiction canon as precedential in ways that challenge the conventional account of the
jurisprudential status of the canons).
17.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (discussing the
development of new canons in the Rehnquist Court); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory
Interpretation,68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149 (2001) (seeking to explain interpretive change on the basis
of shifting expectations of actors in the interpretive system); see also infra Section II.A.1
(discussing how the jurisdiction canon developed), Part III (discussing structural and ideological
factors that are influencing the trajectory of the jurisdiction canon).
18.
See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons:How Lower Courts React
When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481,
546-58 (2015) (discussing how changes in interpretive methodology are transmitted from the
Supreme Court to the lower courts); see also infra Sections III.A-B (explaining why lower courts
may be more favorably disposed toward the jurisdiction canon than is the Supreme Court).
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for other reasons. This view finds its most famous expression in
Professor Karl Llewellyn's classic article on the canons, with its chart
pairing many of the canons of interpretation with competing canons
pointing the opposite direction, which was meant to show that the
canons themselves could not direct decisions. 19 More recent work,
proceeding in a more systematic empirical fashion, has likewise cast
doubt on the ability of the canons to constrain judicial preferences, at
least in certain contexts. 20
The skeptical account has some force to it, but the strongest
versions of the skeptical view of the canons go too far in disparaging
the canons' role. At a minimum, the prevailing interpretive rules and
frameworks make certain decisional pathways easier to follow by
providing ready-made intellectual shortcuts and fostering habits of
mind that favor certain outcomes over others. 21 Especially in cases
with low ideological stakes or in situations in which the time available
to reach a decision is limited, presumptions favoring one outcome
probably do guide decisions to an important degree. 22 Those
conditions-of low stakes and little time-tend to be the norm in lower
courts. 2 3 So even if the canons (and other legal doctrines, for that
matter) are employed sporadically and opportunistically in the
Supreme Court, which tends to be the skeptics' focus, the canons can
have some real bite in the lower courts, which is where the vast bulk
of cases are decided. Moreover, even setting aside case outcomes, the
canons affect how judges must justify their decisions and how
attorneys must fashion their arguments, both of which are important
in their own right.2 4
If the strongest forms of canon skepticism are overstated, that
does not mean we should swing to the other extreme and adopt the

19. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
20. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 96-108 (2005).
21. See Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1976
(2005) (stating that methodological propositions are dicta rather than binding holdings but that
they are nonetheless practically important in shaping later decisions).
22. See, e.g., Brian Sheppard, Judging Under Pressure: A Behavioral Examination of the
Relationship Between Legal Decisionmaking and Time, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 931 (2012)
(providing experimental evidence that reducing the time available for decisionmaking increases
the likelihood that decisionmakers will follow legal constraints).
See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
23.
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 9-10 (2013).

24. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998). Even Llewellyn said that the canons "are still needed tools of
argument." Llewellyn, supranote 19, at 401.
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naive view that the canons are wholly autonomous external
constraints that follow their own timeless logic. Although the skeptics'
goal is presumably to direct our attention away from the canons
altogether and instead toward the "real" determinants of judicial
decisions, crediting the skeptical account with some truth actually
makes the canons interesting in new ways. Particular canons move
into and out of vogue, expand or contract, as a result of various
contextual influences, including evolving judicial attitudes. Thus, if
the Supreme Court becomes more inclined to favor expansive federal
jurisdiction, then it will tend to ignore or reject the narrowconstruction canon. That does not mean the canon has no significance.
On the contrary, the use (or disuse or modified formulation) of the
canon helps to convey, to litigants and lower courts, the high Court's
preferences regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction in a way that
transcends the outcome of a particular case. In other words, we can
think of changes in the use of a canon as an expression of the balance
of forces of the day and as a means of communicating changes through
the judicial system. 2 5
The Article is organized as follows. Part I sets the stage for
what follows by providing some brief introductory remarks about the
jurisdiction canon. The normative and descriptive aspects of the study
are found in Parts II and III respectively. The Conclusion provides
some broader observations about statutory interpretation and
interpretive change.
I. DEFINING THE JURISDICTION CANON
It is useful to begin by explaining more clearly what the
narrow-construction canon is and what role it plays in statutory
interpretation.
A. Various Aspects of the PresumptionAgainst
FederalSubject-Matter Jurisdiction
As noted at the outset, the fundamental postulate of the federal
courts is that they are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction.
Growing out of that proposition is a cluster of ideas regarding
procedure, evidence, and statutory interpretation. This collection of
ideas is sometimes called the presumption against federal

25.
See generally Bruhl, supra note 18, at 546-58 (discussing how changes in interpretive
methodology are transmitted to the lower courts).
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jurisdiction 26 or, in the removal-jurisdiction context in particular, the
presumption against removal. 27 For purposes of analysis, we need to
disentangle the various components of this presumption.
To begin with, one aspect of the presumption against
jurisdiction is the proposition that courts should assume that a case
lies outside of federal subject-matter jurisdiction until jurisdiction is
established. The need to establish jurisdiction then requires various
procedural rules for how to overcome the initial presumption: who
bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, using what documents,
at what stage of the case, and so on. Today, most of those procedural
rules reinforce the initial no-jurisdiction starting point by placing
various obstacles in the way of jurisdiction: for example, a plaintiff
filing in federal court must allege jurisdictional facts in the complaint
and then be prepared to prove them if challenged, the parties cannot
consent to jurisdiction, and a defect in jurisdiction can be raised for
the first time on appeal. 28
In addition to functioning as a starting point, a presumption
against jurisdiction can also act as a factual tie-breaker. In civil
disputes that reach trial, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving his
or her case on the merits by a preponderance of the evidence, and if
the fact-finder believes the evidence is in equipoise on any element,
the plaintiff should lose. 29 Similarly, when a jurisdictional fact must
be proven by a preponderance, jurisdiction fails when the evidence is
evenly balanced.30
The topic of this Article is a different aspect of the presumption
against jurisdiction, namely a rule of statutory interpretation. It is
conventional to divide interpretive canons into several categories,
most prominently textual canons and substantive canons, the latter
being a collection of background principles and presumptions that

26.
See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Renne v.
Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991); Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir.
1974).
27.
See, e.g., Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir.
2001); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias
Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 636-37 (2004).
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), 12(h)(3); McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298
28.
U.S. 178, 188-89 (1936); WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 3, § 3522, at 122.
29.
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1627 (2016).
30. See Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015); Meridian Sec.
Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 540 (7th Cir. 2006). Note that jurisdictional facts that overlap
with the merits may be subject to lenient, prima facie standards of proof in order to prevent an
early judicial inquiry into jurisdiction from determining the plaintiffs ultimate entitlement to
relief on the merits. See Kevin M. Clermont, JurisdictionalFact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 100611 (2006).
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promote certain interests or policies. 31 The canon calling for narrow
construction of jurisdictional statutes is a substantive canon that
promotes a policy of limiting federal judicial authority. Substantive
canons are often phrased as interpretive presumptions-the
presumption against retroactivity, the presumption that Congress
does not pass statutes violating international law, etc. 3 2 In order to
distinguish the interpretive canon governing jurisdictional statutes
from the other aspects of the presumption against federal jurisdiction
described above, I will typically refer to it as "the jurisdiction canon,"
"the narrow-construction rule," or the like.
To provide an example of the jurisdiction canon in operation,
consider the following scenario: a plaintiff sues a defendant in state
court, and the defendant then impleads a third party who, according
to the original defendant, is required to reimburse the defendant if the
defendant is found liable to the plaintiff. This new party, the thirdparty defendant, wishes to remove the suit to federal court. If the
requirements for federal jurisdiction are otherwise satisfied, can this
party remove even though the original defendant did not? If binding
precedent within the relevant jurisdiction did not already provide an
answer, a court's analysis of the question would certainly give careful
consideration to the text of the removal statute, which provides that
"the defendant or the defendants" may remove. 33 One obvious question
is whether the third-party defendant is a "defendant" within the
meaning of the statute. Purely as a linguistic matter, the answer is
probably yes and no: the third party is a defendant on the impleader
claim but is not an original defendant in the plaintiffs complaint. In
light of this uncertainty, the court might rely on legislative history,
precedents that address related situations, practical consequences, or,
most relevantly here, a substantive canon. It is unclear whether this
kind of party is a "defendant," the court could reason, and so the court
should read the statute
narrowly-that is, against federal
jurisdiction-so as to permit only an original defendant, but not a
third-party defendant, to invoke the court's removal jurisdiction. 34
This is of course just one illustration; the canon features prominently
in many disputes over the scope of the jurisdictional statutes. 35

31. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supranote 5, at 1195-1215 (categorizing canons this way).
32. See id. at 691-92 (listing examples of substantive canons phrased as presumptions).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
34. See First Nat'l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2002) (relying heavily
on the narrow-construction canon to reach the result described in this paragraph).
35. See, e.g., Baldy v. First Niagara Pavilion, C.C.R.L., LLC, 149 F. Supp. 3d 551, 557-63
(W.D. Pa. 2015) (repeatedly citing the narrow-construction canon in addressing an unsettled
question of removal procedure).
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A different formulation of the presumption against jurisdiction
also deserves mention. Courts very often make statements to the
effect that all "doubts" should be resolved against federal jurisdiction
or, specifically in the context of removal jurisdiction, that all doubts
should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.36 When opinions
say this, sometimes they appear to be invoking a tie-breaker rule for
close factual disputes or a procedural rule allocating the burden to the
party invoking jurisdiction. 37 Other times they appear to mean that
uncertainties about the interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes
should be read against jurisdiction (i.e., they are invoking the
jurisdiction canon). 38 And in many instances it is just hard to know
which rule or combination of rules courts mean to invoke when they
say doubts are resolved against jurisdiction. Because of this ambiguity
about the meaning of the "doubts" formulation, I generally avoid it.
A final point: I have been speaking of the jurisdiction canon, in
the singular, as a rule applicable to the interpretation of jurisdictional
statutes generally. That is how courts have usually understood the
canon. (Courts invoke the canon with particular frequency when it
comes to removal jurisdiction, 39 but that is just a particular
manifestation of the broader rule.) One could imagine an alternative
interpretive regime in which different jurisdictional statutes carry
with them different interpretive rules (this statute interpreted
broadly, this one narrowly, this one neutrally, etc.). In fact, the
jurisdiction canon seems to have gained its initial prominence, more
than a century ago, as a rule about the interpretation of the 1887
amendments to the jurisdictional statutes, and then it generalized
from there. 40 Further, it may be that we are headed toward a world in
which the jurisdiction canon becomes fractured into multiple, varying
rules applicable to different jurisdictional statutes; that possibility is a
topic to which we will return later. 41

36. E.g., Vantage Drilling Co. v. Hsin-Chi Su, 741 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2014); Salton v.
Polyock, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1035 (N.D. Iowa 2011). Electronic database searches reveal many,
many examples.

37. E.g., Rindels v. Tyco Integrated Sec., LLC, No. CV 14-6536 RSWL (CWx), 2015 WL
469013, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015).
38. E.g., Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625
(8th Cir. 1997).
39. See Haiber, supra note 27, at 636 ("[R]arely does a decision concerning removal not
begin with some variation of the axiom dictating strict construction of removal jurisdiction.").
40. See infra Section II.A.l.a.
41. See infra Sections II.G, III.E.
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B. The Meaning and Significance of Narrow Construction
of JurisdictionalStatutes
Courts sometimes describe the jurisdiction canon as one calling
for "narrow" construction of jurisdictional statutes, but it is more
common for them to speak of "strictly" construing such statutes. What,
if anything, is the distinction between narrowness and strictness? 42
In the abstract, it is a bit unclear what it means to read a legal
text "strictly."43 The notion of strict construction sometimes has been
used as a crude synonym for reaching politically conservative results,
especially in the context of constitutional law. 4 4 In part because of
such political connotations, it might be advisable not to use the
terminology of strict construction at all. Nonetheless, courts and
commentators often use such language, and when they say that
jurisdictional statutes are to be construed strictly, that means that
jurisdictional statutes are to be read so as to resolve uncertainties
against the existence of jurisdiction-that is, to give a narrowerrather
than a broader scope to federal judicial jurisdiction. Judicial usage
confirms this rough equivalence between strictness and narrowness,
as courts using the jurisdiction canon sometimes switch between the
two terms. 45 And, of course, the notion of strict construction has an
ancient pedigree in statutory interpretation. One of the oldest rules of
42. One might also wonder whether there is a difference between strict/narrow
interpretation and strict/narrow construction. Especially in constitutional theory, commentators
sometimes distinguish between the two activities, defining interpretation as the discovery of
semantic meaning and construction as the imputation of legal content. This distinction is not
often made by legislation scholars or by courts using the jurisdiction canon, and so following
their lead I will use the terms "interpretation" and "construction" interchangeably. If, however,
one does attend to the distinction, it is probably more appropriate to categorize the jurisdiction
canon as a rule of construction rather than interpretation. In that regard it resembles most other
substantive canons, though it is possible that some substantive canons can reflect or become
conventions that bear on semantic meaning. See Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstructionDistinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 111-14 (2010).
43. Cf. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Strict Construction and JudicialActivism,
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Mar. 8, 2015), http://1solum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2015/03/legal-theorylexicon-strict-construction-and-judicial-activism.html [https://perma.cc/8T6Z-UYTT] (providing
several possible meanings of the concept of strict construction in the context of constitutional
law).
44.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 n.*

(1980).
45. E.g., Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 733 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 2013) ("We strictly
construe statutes conferring jurisdiction. . . . [I]f there is ambiguity as to whether the instant
statute confers federal jurisdiction over this case, we are compelled to adopt a reasonable,
narrow construction." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Robinson v. Ortho-

McNeil Pharm., Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 838, 842 (S.D. Ill. 2008) (stating that removal statutes
"must be strictly and narrowly construed"); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 1206
(referring to the jurisdiction canon as a rule of "[n]arrow construction").
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interpretation, the rule of lenity, is often stated as a rule that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed. 46 Many other substantive canons
have likewise traditionally been phrased as rules of strict
construction-statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed, for example-and this is understood to mean those statutes
should be read narrowly rather than expansively in close cases.

47

So,

strict construction of jurisdictional statutes is, for our purposes,
interchangeable with narrow construction.
Still, one might wonder how exactly one is to know the
difference between a narrow/strict reading on the one hand and a
broad/liberal reading on the other, much less how one is to distinguish
either one from a merely "normal" reading. The old treatise writers
filled many pages discussing such questions, as they had to, given that
so much of traditional statutory interpretation consisted of
designating certain classes of statutes as subject to either strict
interpretation or liberal interpretation. 48 This is not to say the old
writers, or even modern ones, have arrived at a precise, fully
satisfying resolution. At a minimum, statutes subject to strict
construction are not subject to purposive expansion-that is, reading
them beyond their terms in order to reach cases that present the same
mischief. 49 A different way to express the idea of strict construction,
which one also finds in the treatises, is to say that a statute subject to
strict construction is triggered only when purpose and language
coincide: "[N]o cases shall be held to fall within [the strictly construed
statute]," the treatise writer William Maxwell explained, "which do
not fall both within the reasonable meaning of its terms and within
the spirit and scope of the enactment."5 0 Still another way to capture
the idea is to say that words subject to strict interpretation should be
limited to their prototypical applications (a sparrow is a prototypical
bird, shooting a gun is a prototypical way to "use" a gun) rather than
encompassing cases that may fit within definitional criteria but are
located at the periphery of the concept (like a penguin as an example
46.

See United States v. Wiltberger,

18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820);

1 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *88.
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supranote 5, at 690-91.
48.
E.g., JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION §§ 191-240 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1882); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE
ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND
47.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291-383 (N.Y.C., John S. Voorhies Law Bookseller & Publisher 1857); J.G.
SUTHERLAND,
1891).
49.

STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§§

346-431 (Chi., Callaghan & Co.

SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 243-44, 246-47

(London, William Maxwell & Son 1875).
50. Id. at 238.
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of a bird or trading a gun for drugs as "using" a gun). 5 1 A further
difficulty in defining the jurisdiction canon concerns its relationship to
textual clarity and other interpretive considerations. A powerful form
of the canon would be capable of overriding the most natural reading
of the text in favor of a less natural (but still plausible) reading, while
a weak version would apply only when two competing meanings
remain roughly equally plausible after considering all permissible
resources.
We should not worry too much about the difficulties inherent in
expressing the precise meaning of narrow construction or explaining
how exactly it fits into the process of interpretation. Those difficulties
are not unique to this canon; on the contrary, knowing which cases a
canon covers, at what stage it should be applied, how much weight to
give it, and so forth are problems that afflict interpretation generally.
Such questions have not yielded simple, consistent answers. 52 Perhaps
in the end some canons of interpretation are best understood as
directions to approach a statute in a certain mood, with an attitude of
generosity on the one hand or stinginess on the other. In any event, as
stated at the outset, the use of a canon can act as a signal of a court's
mindset and as a means of communicating its attitudes to other courts
and litigants. From that point of view, the precise technical operation
of a canon is not so important; what matters is whether it tends to be
mentioned and affirmed on the one hand or ignored and questioned on
the other.
II. NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE JURISDICTION CANON
The jurisdiction canon has been repeated thousands of times,
but its justifications are rarely stated, much less scrutinized. Is the
canon defensible? If so, why? Only because it has been repeated so
often? This Part explores those questions.
There are several potential justifications for an interpretive
rule that loads the dice against exercises of federal judicial
jurisdiction. The justification could rely on a descriptive claim about
what Congress wants (or would probably want if it thought about the
matter). Or the justification could be more openly normative,
appealing to judicial notions of sound policy whether or not Congress
endorses them. Or perhaps we could understand the canon as a softer

51.
See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 62-74 (2010) (discussing the
linguistic concept of prototypical meaning).
52.

See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226-30, 367-75 (2011); Amy Coney

Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 117-18 (2010).
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form of constitutional law, a rule that has the power to push statutes
away from the outer bounds of Article III authority. This Part of the
Article will canvas and evaluate a variety of potential justifications for
the jurisdiction canon, including arguments of the sort just mentioned.
I should state at the outset, however, that some of the arguments
about the canon do not lend themselves to easy resolutions, as they
reflect abiding disagreements about the role of the federal courts and
the relative importance of stability versus other values. Yet even when
ultimate verdicts are hard to reach, it is still useful to lay out the
competing considerations in a systematic way.
The normative analysis does not begin with a blank slate. Ours
is a system based on precedent and tradition, and so history can settle
a matter even if it would be resolved differently as a de novo matter
today. Therefore, one should begin with what has come before.
A. Precedentand History
This Section traces the jurisdiction canon's development and
asks whether it should survive as a matter of stare decisis or, less
formally, because the canon has deep roots in the past that have
generated practices and expectations that current courts should
respect. Recounting this history also has independent value because
the story of the development of the canon is not widely known.
1. A History of the Jurisdiction Canon
The canon of narrow construction of jurisdictional statutes has
been cited so much that one might assume it to be ancient and
unchanging. Some canons may be that way-such as linguistic
maxims that capture some of the truth of ordinary usage-but many
canons are neither timeless nor immutable. On the contrary, they
evolve: federalism presumptions bulk up into clear-statement rules, 5 3
canons regarding agency deference expand to new domains,54 and so
on.55 The jurisdiction canon too has a history. And the history is
shorter and more uneven than many would suspect.

53. See Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 17, at 619-29.
54. E.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57-58
(2011) (holding that Chevron deference doctrine applies to judicial review of Treasury
regulations).
55. See Barrett, supra note 52, at 127 & n.84 (citing examples of substantive canons that
evolved over time); Bruhl, supra note 18, at 507-46 (discussing various instances of canonical
change).
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a. The Slow Development of the Canon
We can begin with the canon's English antecedents. The
mother country did not have parallel federal and state courts as we do,
but it did have a multiplicity of courts of varying jurisdiction and a
legislature that could create, alter, or abolish those jurisdictions. 5 6 The
courts tended to disfavor legislative tinkering with jurisdiction, and
this disfavor generated what we could call substantive canons of
interpretation. The judges presumed that Parliament did not create
novel jurisdictions by implication, and they accordingly read
jurisdictional grants narrowly, against jurisdiction in cases of doubt.5 7
At the same time, in the same conservative spirit, the courts also
applied a rule disfavoring implied ousters of established jurisdiction.5 8
Although this history provided the materials that one could
imagine being translated in this country into an interpretive canon
disfavoring federal jurisdiction, the now-familiar narrow-construction
canon did not immediately spring into life in anything resembling its
current form. It is true that the federal courts were recognized, very
early, to be courts of limited jurisdiction and, concomitantly, that they
were presumed to lack jurisdiction until its existence was shown. 59
That much should sound familiar, for modern courts say the same
things.6 0 Nonetheless, many familiar features of modern law that are
thought to follow from those basic propositions-such as the rule that
jurisdiction can be questioned at any time, 61 the rule that the party
invoking jurisdiction must prove jurisdictional facts if challenged, 62

56.

See generally W.S. HOLDSWORTH, 1 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (A. L. Goodhart & H.

G. Hanbury eds., rev. 7th ed. 1956) (discussing the development and jurisdictions of England's
many courts).
57.
FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES: THEIR RULES OF
CONSTRUCTION, AND THE PROPER BOUNDARIES OF LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

652 (London, William Benning & Co. 2d ed. 1848); MAXWELL, supranote 49, at 110-12, 264-66.
58.
DWARRIS, supra note 57, at 652; MAXWELL, supranote 49, at 105-10.
59.
For an early example, consider Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8
(1799), in which the Court observed:
A circuit court [i.e., the federal trial court at the time] . . . is of limited jurisdiction:
and has cognisance, not of cases generally, but only of a few specially
circumstanced .... And the fair presumption is (not as with regard to a court of
general jurisdiction, that a cause is within its jurisdiction unless the contrary appears,
but rather) that a cause is without its jurisdiction, until the contrary appears.
Id. at 10.
60.
E.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ("Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. . . . It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction.. . ." (citing Turner, 4 U.S. at 11)).
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3522, at 122.
62. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1936).
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and so forth-were not embraced at the beginning. 6 3 Rather, the early
federal practice, which was partly influenced by the limitations of
common law procedure, provided that proper pleading of jurisdictional
requisites created a prima facie case for jurisdiction that the other
side bore the burden of factually rebutting and, further, that a party
could forfeit the chance to object to jurisdiction by failing to make a
timely objection. 64 Some of these pro-jurisdiction procedural rules,
which seem foreign to us now, persisted for quite some time. 65
As for interpretations of the scope of the subject-matter
jurisdiction provided by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and other early
statutes, the Supreme Court's record was mixed. In some cases, one
sees narrow constructions of jurisdictional statutes, such as in the
famous early case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss (1806), which concerned
the interpretation of the ancestor of the modern diversity statute.6 6
Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the statute to require what we
would today call "complete" diversity of citizenship, that is, that each
plaintiff be diverse from each defendant. The opinion was very brief. It
did not cite any interpretive canon, or other interpretive tools for that
matter, but the fame of Strawbridge might lead some to think that
narrow construction was the uniform practice all along. Yet that is not
the case. Some other early cases, which unlike Strawbridge are mostly
forgotten today, favored broad interpretations of federal jurisdiction,
including the diversity jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 67 In any
event, one does not find in the early Republic a well-established
interpretive canon of narrow construction of the sort one finds
constantly repeated in lower-court cases today.
After the foundational Judiciary Act, the next critical period in
the development of federal jurisdiction came during and shortly after
the Civil War. In response to the War and its aftermath, Congress
enacted a string of statutes expanding the federal courts' jurisdiction,
63. See generally Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1830
(2007).
64. Id. at 1839, 1876-77.
65. Id. at 1870-71. Collins suspects that these practices persisted not just because of the
strictures of common-law pleading rules but because the Supreme Court wished to broaden
access to federal courts. Id. at 1882-83.
66. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
67.

See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at

837 (1988) (stating that the Court took a "relatively aggressive stance" in construing certain
aspects of diversity jurisdiction, though the Court was cautious in other respects); see also id. at
843-45 (providing examples of expansive interpretations of the diversity jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts). In one of the cases cited by White, an attorney argued for a canon of liberal
interpretation of diversity jurisdiction; Chief Justice Marshall's terse opinion ruled in favor of
jurisdiction but did not cite such a principle. Young v. Bryan, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 146, 149, 15152 (1821).
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including removal provisions aimed at protecting federal officials,
Union supporters, freedmen, and others who could not expect fair
treatment from the state courts in the South. 68 Later, in 1871,
Congress enacted new legislation providing federal remedies and
jurisdiction for violations of civil rights. 69 But the Civil War and
Reconstruction period also saw jurisdictional expansion motivated by
quite different goals, namely congressional Republicans' plan to
promote economic development by (among other things) expanding
commercial interests' access to national courts. 70 The era's most
significant enactment, from the jurisdictional perspective, was the
landmark 1875 statute that gave the federal courts their now-familiar
jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law and further expanded
opportunities for removal from state courts.7 1
New statutes require interpretation, and one would expect the
interpretive activity occasioned by the new jurisdictional legislation to
provide an opportunity for the development of interpretive canons. Yet
while there was plenty of interpretive activity occurring, no clear
interpretive canon for jurisdictional statutes developed. In some cases,
the Supreme Court responded sympathetically to the legislative goal
of expanding access to the national courts, especially for railroads and
other national enterprises. 72 Indeed, the Court at times described the
legislature's expansions of federal jurisdiction as "remedial" in nature
and, according to the traditional rule for remedial statutes, gave the
statutes a liberal construction in order to accomplish Congress's
goals. 73 Treating the statutes as remedial in this way would, of course,
run directly contrary to the modern notion that jurisdictional statutes
68.
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 61 (1928); STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 147-54 (1968).

69. See, e.g., 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3573, at 547, 554 (discussing the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871).
70. See KUTLER, supra note 68, at 157-60; Howard Gillman, How PoliticalPartiesCan Use
the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM.
POL. Sol. REV. 511, 516-17 (2002); William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial
Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 342 (1969).
71. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 68, at
64-65.
72. See KUTLER, supra note 68, at 156-58; Gillman, supra note 70, at 518-19; see also
Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717,
729-30 (1986) (explaining that the Supreme Court and lower courts gave the removal provisions
of the 1875 Act a broad and enthusiastic reading). A notable broad reading of the defendant's
right to remove came in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), which
interpreted the 1875 Act to permit defendants to remove state-law claims based on the
defendants' federal corporate charter.
73. E.g., Home Life Ins. Co. of Brooklyn v. Dunn, 86 U.S. 214, 224 (1873) ("[T]he [1867
removal] statute is remedial, and must be construed liberally.").
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should be construed narrowly. Yet in other cases the Justices
responded with caution to some of Congress's boldest jurisdictional
innovations, reading the statutes to preserve established limitations
that Congress might have intended to overturn. 74 All in all, the
Court's record in the post-bellum years was hardly uniform in one
direction or the other.75 In any event, the Court's response to the
jurisdictional statutes of the 1860s and 1870s does at least belie any
notion that narrow construction is a long-standing, deeply rooted
policy of the law.
As further evidence that the modern idea of strict construction
of federal jurisdiction is a relatively late arrival, consider G.A.
Endlich's 1880s American revision of Maxwell's famous British
treatise on statutory interpretation. Drawing on Maxwell's teachings
but adding support from American (mostly state) jurisprudence,
Endlich initially recites both the presumption against ousting existing
jurisdiction and the presumption against creating new jurisdiction.7 6
Coming then to the particularly American problem of federal courts,
Endlich writes:
The presumption against the extension, or creation of new jurisdictions is one of
considerable practical importance as affecting the powers of federal courts. The federal
courts have, strictly speaking, no common law jurisdiction; and as their jurisdiction is
special and not general, there can be no presumption of jurisdiction in their favor and
the record must disclose all the facts necessary to give them cognizance of the case
under the various acts of Congress. In the construction of these acts, however, a
77
reasonable liberality is not to be denied to their language.

Endlich was unusual in directly addressing the issue of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. Other nineteenth-century treatises on
statutory interpretation focused on state courts and general
principles, often reciting an unhelpful mix of canons-for example,
that statutes creating jurisdictions not recognized at common law are
strictly construed, except when they are not, such as when the

74. In the 1873 Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, the Supreme Court did not cite a
narrow-construction rule, but the Court did say that it should not read the recent removal
statutes to override long-standing restrictions on removal unless their language unmistakably so
required. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553, 584-87 (1873); see also KUTLER, supra note 68, at 153-54
(arguing that the Court failed to honor congressional intent in that case).
75.

See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY

JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 87-147 (1992) (describing the Court's
shifting approaches to diversity jurisdiction and diversity removal cases).
76.

G.A. ENDLICH, COMMENTARIES ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 211, 217-19, 488,

736 (Jersey City, N.J., Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1888).
77. Id. at 221-22 (emphasis added).
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statutes are deemed remedial.7 8 Treatises on federal jurisdiction from

the early 1880s do not state a rule of strict construction. 79
All of this leaves us with this surprising finding: almost one
hundred years into the life of the federal courts, there was no canon of
strictly construing federal jurisdiction or, at least, nothing resembling
the well-established and oft-repeated canon we see today.
Things would soon begin to change, however, both in the courts
and in Congress. Traces of the modern narrow-construction rule began
to appear in lower-court opinions in the 1880s. The statutes of the
1860s and 1870s had led to massively swollen federal dockets,80 and
some federal judges began to react against generous grants of
jurisdiction. In one 1885 case, Judge Brewer, who would later be
appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, wrote:
[I]t must be remembered that in questions of doubt as to jurisdiction, the federal courts

should remand. They should not be covetous, but miserly, of jurisdiction. . . . The
overburdened docket of this court should not be loaded with removed cases, unless its
jurisdiction is clear and the mandates of the law imperatively require it. 8 1

In 1887, Congress enacted important legislation that cut back on
jurisdiction, especially removal jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, a
leading authority of the day explained the change in congressional
policy reflected in that statute and how the courts responded to it:
The history of the Federal jurisdiction is one of constant growth; slow, indeed, during
the first half-century and more, but very rapid within the last few years. . .. But a
strong reactionary tendency has been manifested in the latest enactment of Congress
upon this subject, [namely the 1887 statute.] . . . Its apparent design is to stem the tide
of litigation pouring into the Federal courts . . . . In fact the courts hold that the
intention of the act to restrict the removal of causes is so clear that it must be strictly
construed against anyone seeking to evade the additional requirements which it puts
upon the right of removal.

82

78. See BISHOP, supra note 48, at 190-91. The treatise writer most remembered today,
because his treatise lives on in modern editions, is Sutherland. His 1891 first edition included
several sections that present historically familiar canons applicable to jurisdictional statutes,
including a presumption against ouster of established jurisdictions and a rule that limited
jurisdictions should be construed strictly, but it did not address federal courts in particular.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 48, §§ 421, 504-07, 561. Another treatise from the same era also
repeats these familiar twin presumptions, but it likewise does not have anything to say about
federal courts in particular. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND

INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 123-24 (St. Paul, W. Publ'g Co. 1896).
&

79.
GEORGE W. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND JURISDICTION OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1883); WILLIAM E. MILLER
GEORGE W. FIELD, FEDERAL PRACTICE (Des Moines, Mills & Co. 1881).

80.
81.

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supranote 68, at 60-65, 77-78, 86-87.
Kansas v. Bradley, 26 F. 289, 292 (C.C.D. Kan. 1885).

82.

HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK & JOHN F. DILLON, REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS

TO FEDERAL COURTS 2-4 (St. Louis, Cent. Law Journal Co. 5th ed. 1889) (emphasis omitted); see
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Another treatise, written at the turn of the century, observed that
some older cases, presumably those interpreting the 1860s and 1875
statutes, had stated or implied that removal provisions should be
liberally construed. "But," the treatise cautioned, "that is not the
present practice"; instead, "[removal] statutes should be strictly
construed." 83 In the waning years of the nineteenth century and the
early years of the twentieth, one can find quite a number of
statements in lower-court cases referring to a purportedly wellestablished practice of construing the removal statutes narrowly. 84
The authorities just cited focused on removal jurisdiction, in
some cases referring to the congressional policies behind the 1887 Act
in particular, and these cases are not much cited today as sources for
the narrow-construction canon in its more general form. For the
source of the modern rule, which has been understood to apply to
jurisdictional statutes generally, one must look a bit later. When one
examines today's lower-court invocations of the canon and traces the
line of authority back through the sedimented layers of circuit
precedent, one usually ends up with one of two Supreme Court cases:
Healy v. Ratta (1934)85 or Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets
(1941).86 Healy addressed the issue of how to measure the amount in
controversy in a dispute over a license fee. If the relevant amount was

the small fee immediately due, the jurisdictional amount was not
satisfied; if the proper amount was the reduction in the value of the
also Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 462 (1894) (referring to the 1887 Act's
"general policy" of "contract[ing]" jurisdiction).
83.

B.C. MOON, THE REMOVAL OF CAUSES 47, 48 n.5 (1901). From reading the relevant

sections of Moon's treatise, it is plain that he was a booster of the narrow-construction canon, not
just a dispassionate reporter. Given the concrete stakes involved in forum choice, it is not
surprising to see, then or now, that observation and prescription can blend.
84. E.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 201 F. 932, 945 (E.D. Tenn. 1912)
(referring to a "well-settled rule" of remanding when jurisdiction is unclear); Heller v. Ilwaco Mill
& Lumber Co., 178 F. 111, 112 (C.C.D. Or. 1910) (referring to a "tendency ... to construe [the
1887 act] strictly against the right of removal"); Shane v. Butte Elec. Ry. Co., 150 F. 801, 812
(C.C.D. Mont. 1906) (stating that "the federal courts have recognized that the statutes of removal
should be construed not in a way to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction where the question is
doubtful"); Crane Co. v. Guanica Centrale, 132 F. 713, 713 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (remanding
where authorities were split regarding whether the amount sought in a counterclaim could be
added to the plaintiffs claim in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount and stating that "where
a substantial doubt exists as to the jurisdiction of the federal court the case should be
remanded"); Dwyer v. Peshall, 32 F. 497 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) ("The amendments of 1887 were
plainly meant to restrict removals from state to federal courts. . . . The intention of the act is so
clear that it should be strictly construed against any one seeking to evade the additional
limitations which it puts upon the right of removal."); see also Haiber, supra note 27, at 624
(identifying judicial interpretations of the 1887 statute as the source of the rule of strictly
construing removal).

85.
86.

292 U.S. 263 (1934).'
313 U.S. 100 (1941).
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business caused by the licensing requirement, the jurisdictional
amount would be met.8 7 The Court ruled that the former measure was

proper and ordered dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.88 In reaching that
conclusion, the Court stated:
Not only does the language of the statute point to this conclusion, but the policy clearly
indicated by the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts
supports it. . . . [T]he jurisdiction of federal courts of first instance has been narrowed by

successive acts of Congress, which have progressively increased the jurisdictional
amount. The policy of the statute calls for its strict construction.... Due regard for the
rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts,
requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which
the statute has defined.

89

The other frequently cited source for the canon, especially as
regards removal jurisdiction, is Shamrock Oil & Gas. That case
addressed whether a plaintiff who had filed in state court could
remove to federal court when faced with a counterclaim that satisfied
the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. 90 The Supreme Court ruled
that the plaintiff could not remove. The Court reasoned that the thencurrent removal statute restricted removal to "the defendant or
defendants" and that this language was narrower, and was intended
by Congress to be narrower, than the prior version of the statute,
which had referred to "either party."9 1 The Court then added: "Not
only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional
purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal,
but the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the
jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of
such legislation." 92 One might observe that here, as in Healy, the
reference to an interpretive presumption came after the Court had
already mentioned other factors that pointed in the same direction;
the presumption was, therefore, arguably unnecessary to the result. 93
Such are the relative trickles of authority that eventually became the
daily flood of support, in lower-court citations, for the general rule of
narrow construction.

87.
292 U.S. at 265-66.
88.
Id. at 272.
89.
Id. at 269-70 (citations and footnote omitted).
90.
313 U.S. at 102-03.
91.
Id. at 104-08.
92.
Id. at 108. The Court concluded this paragraph with a quotation and citation to Healy.
Id. at 109.
93.
More broadly, one could argue that interpretive rules are never necessary, that they
are always dicta. The precedential status of the canons is addressed below. See infra Section

II.A.2.
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b. The Supreme Court's Recent Neglect and Negativity
Recent history has not been kind to the jurisdiction canon.
Endorsements of the canon at the Supreme Court level have become
rare. 94 More common is neglect. In one 1999 case, which interpreted
the timing requirements for removal, one of the main points of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's brief dissent was to accuse the majority of
"depart[ing] from this Court's practice of strictly construing removal
and similar jurisdictional statutes."9 5 One might have expected the
majority to respond, perhaps by explaining that the canon had been
overcome by other considerations, but the majority did not mention
the canon at all. 9 6 To be sure, any particular omission of the canon can
be deemed insignificant. Yet, as the following paragraphs explain, the
Supreme Court's cases show a pattern of negative treatment that is
hard to ignore.
When the modern Court does mention the jurisdiction canon,
what it says is often ambivalent or even hostile. In 2003, the Court
cited Shamrock Oil & Gas and referred (at least in paraphrasing a
party's argument) to a "federal policy of construing removal
jurisdiction narrowly."9 7 The Court nonetheless went on to hold that
there was removal jurisdiction and-in a passage that looks
portentous in retrospect-questioned the validity of the narrowconstruction rule, at least in certain types of removal disputes, in light
of post-1941 amendments to the removal statute.9 8 Read for all it is
worth, this passage could be taken to mean that narrow construction
of jurisdiction is not a general policy of the law but merely a function
of the legislative goals behind certain jurisdictional enactments, which
of course Congress can and does change from time to time.
Since then, the Court has gone further to marginalize-and
arguably abrogate-the canon. In 2005, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc., the Court had what is probably its most
94. For one of those rare invocations of the canon, see Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v.
Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (stating that "statutory procedures for removal are to be strictly
construed" and citing four cases from the 1920s through 1940s).
95. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 357 (1999)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
96. The Court's rather short opinion relied largely on traditional practice and pragmatic
considerations. See 526 U.S. at 351-56.
97. Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 697 (2003) (citing Shamrock Oil
& Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)).
98. Breuer, 538 U.S. at 697-98. In 1948, after Shamrock Oil & Gas, the removal statute
was amended to provide that suits within the district courts' original jurisdiction were removable
"[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress," (emphasis added), which the Court
in Breuer understood to put the burden on the party resisting removal to identify such an
express exception to the general rule of removability. See id.
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important encounter with the canon in a non-removal case this
century. 99 Both of the courts of appeals in the consolidated cases under
review in Exxon Mobil had cited the narrow-construction rule in their
opinions. 100 And in the briefing to the Supreme Court, the parties
opposing jurisdiction used the narrow-construction canon in their
arguments. 10 1 The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in both cases
and, more importantly, set out the interpretive principles in the
following way:
We must not give jurisdictional statutes a more expansive interpretation than their text
warrants, but it is just as important not to adopt an artificial construction that is
narrower than what the text provides. No sound canon of interpretation requires
Congress to speak with extraordinary clarity in order to modify the rules of federal
jurisdiction within appropriate constitutional bounds. Ordinary principles of statutory
10 2
construction apply.

Especially in light of the way the case was briefed, the Court's
admonition to use "ordinary principles" of interpretation sounds like a
retreat from the narrow-construction canon. 103 The passage above
could even be taken as an abrogation of the canon: courts should use
"ordinary principles," with no presumptions or tie-breakers against
jurisdiction.
John Roberts joined the Court as Chief Justice shortly after the
Exxon Mobil decision, and since then support for the jurisdiction
canon has further weakened. The first opinion written by the newly
appointed Chief Justice, which concerned the standard for awarding
fees for improper removal, gave no hint that removal was a disfavored,
strictly construed device; if anything, the opinion's repeated
invocations of the defendant's congressionally conferred "right to
remove" suggested the contrary. 10 4 This is not to say that the Roberts
99.
545 U.S. 546 (2005).
100. Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 142 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The
Supreme Court . .. has repeatedly admonished that in light of the burgeoning federal caseload,
diversity jurisdiction must be narrowly construed."), rev'd sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 362 F.3d 739,
757 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (urging the
Supreme Court "to give guidance in applying the 'substantive' canons of statutory
construction .. . includ[ing] the directive to construe jurisdictional grants narrowly").
101. Brief of Petitioner at 12, Exxon Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)
(No. 04-70), 2004 WL 2812088; Brief for Respondent at 36, Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (No. 04-79), 2005 WL 139840.
102. 545 U.S. at 558 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
103. I am not the only one to read the passage this way. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory
Interpretation in the Context of Federal Jurisdiction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 86 (2007)
("Although some prior Court decisions had expressed favor for interpreting jurisdictional
statutes narrowly, Allapattah opined that jurisdictional statutes should presumptively be read
neither broadly nor narrowly." (footnotes omitted)).
104. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 137, 140 (2005).
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Court consistently rules in favor of expanded federal jurisdiction.
Sometimes it does, sometimes it does not. Here we are considering not
the outcomes of particular cases (i.e., jurisdiction exists or not) but
rather whether the Court's reasoning shows that the narrowconstruction canon is a vital tool. For the most part, the Court's
reasoning does not use and endorse the canon. One could discuss
many examples of cases in which the canon might have been cited but
was not, but I will describe two cases-cases that contain the Roberts
Court's most considered statements about the canon. One is highly
negative on the canon and the other is at best equivocal.
The Court's most unfavorable statement came in the December
2014 decision in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens.10 6 In
that case, the Court rejected use of the jurisdiction canon in cases
involving CAFA and cast doubt on the canon's validity as ,a more
general matter. Dart Cherokee involved a routine matter of removal
practice, namely whether a notice of removal had to be accompanied
by evidence (not just allegations) establishing the existence of
necessary jurisdictional facts. The Court easily answered in the
negative: the notice of removal only need include sufficient allegations;
evidence might be required only later, if the allegations were
challenged. Given the fairly obvious error in the lower court's
understanding of removal requirements, 10 6 it was probably
unnecessary for the Court to address the role of background policies
and presumptions. But the Court did:
[The lower court] relied, in part, on a purported "presumption" against removal. We
need not here decide whether such a presumption is proper in mine-run diversity cases.
It suffices to point out that no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA,
which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal
10 7
court.

To drive the point home, the Court then cited a portion of CAFA's
legislative history stating that the statute's "provisions should be read
broadly"1 0 8-i.e., contraryto the traditional canon.
The Supreme Court's rejection of the jurisdiction canon's use in
CAFA cases was contrary to the understandings of lower courts, which
had mostly applied the canon to CAFA cases, 109 but for our purposes
that is not the most important aspect of the decision. The more

105. 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014).
106. Although the Court divided 5-4 in Dart Cherokee, the dissenters did not endorse the
lower court's interpretation of the removal statute. Rather, they contended that the Supreme
Court could not properly reach the issue at all. Id. at 558-59, 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 554 (majority opinion).
108. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 43 (2005), quoted in Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554.
109. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
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significant thing is that the Court took the quite unnecessary step of
referring to the presumption against removal in its more general
form-despite the presumption's prior endorsement by the Supreme
Court and thousands of citations in the lower courts-as merely a
"purported" rule! That sort of dismissive treatment is a bad omen for
the jurisdiction canon, especially when it follows a decade of rude
neglect.
In my estimation, the closest the Roberts Court has come to
expressing the narrow-construction rule is Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, which concerned the interpretation
of a jurisdictional provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.110
The Act provides exclusive federal jurisdiction over suits "brought to
enforce any liability or duty" created by the Act. The question in
Merrill Lynch was whether that jurisdictional grant applied when a
plaintiff alleged violations of the Act's duties but sought relief only on
state-law theories. The Court held that there was no federal
jurisdiction, reasoning that the Act's jurisdictional provision did not go
beyond 28 U.S.C. § 1331's general grant of jurisdiction over claims
that "arise under" federal law, a jurisdictional grant that the parties
agreed did not encompass the plaintiffs claim.11 1 Near the end of its
opinion, after discussing the Act's text and the relevant precedents
interpreting it and similarly worded statutes, the Court turned to
considerations of policy. The opinion stated that "this Court has time
and again declined to construe federal jurisdictional statutes more
expansively than their language, most fairly read, requires" 112 and
observed that the Court had been reluctant to "expand the jurisdiction
of federal courts through a broad reading of jurisdictional statutes." 113
This language clearly rejects any rule of broad/liberalinterpretation,
but it stops short of embracing the traditional rule of narrow/strict
interpretation.To be sure, the difference between narrow, normal, and
broad interpretation is elusive in practice. 114 But the Court's use of
different wording was almost certainly not accidental. The passage at
issue quoted language from Healy and Shamrock Oil & Gas about the
need to give due regard to the role of state courts,11 5 but it did not
quote those cases' much-cited and canon-generative adjacent language

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016).
Id. at 1567, 1575.
Id. at 1573.
Id. (quoting Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959)).
See supra Section I.B.
136 S. Ct. at 1573.
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that refers to "strict construction." 116 Further, the lower court under
review in Merrill Lynch had used the traditional language of strict
construction.1 17

The Supreme Court's attitude toward the canon over roughly
the last decade, which has ranged from neglect to ambivalence to
hostility, has not yet made much of an impression on the lower courts
in non-CAFA cases. 118 As observed at the outset, they cite the canon
hundreds of times every year. 119 This divergence between the practices
of courts at the different levels of the judicial hierarchy is a point to
which we will return later, in the descriptive assessment of the
canon's trajectory. 120
2. Precedential Analysis
Armed with an understanding of the jurisdiction canon's
history, we can consider whether the jurisdiction canon is justified as
a matter of precedent. As the history revealed, the jurisdiction canon's
pedigree is a bit weaker and more contingent than one might guess
given the frequency with which lower courts now cite it. Of course, our
modern notion of precedent does not require much to make law. If the
Supreme Court says something once, that statement becomes the law
of the land until overruled, at least as far as lower courts are
concerned. 12 1 One published opinion by a court of appeals generally
116. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93 (discussing these cases' roles as sources for
the jurisdiction canon). The same paragraph of Merrill Lynch also quoted Romero, but again not
Romero's own quotation, two sentences before, of Healy's "strict construction" language.
117. Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir.
2014), aff'd, 136 S. Ct. 1562.
118. See 16 GEORGENE VAIRO, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 107.05 (3d ed. 2016)
("Recent developments have cast some doubt on the axioms that removal is strictly construed
and that a presumption exists against removal . . . . Nevertheless, federal courts continue to
recite these axioms [i.e., of narrow construction]."); Bruhl, supra note 18, at 532-33 (noting that
lower courts largely ignored the Supreme Court's negative statements about the canon in Exxon
Mobil). For an example of a rare lower-court opinion that saw Exxon Mobil as diminishing the
canon, see PalisadesCollections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d. 327, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2008) (Niemeyer,
J., dissenting).
119. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
120. See infra Sections III.A-B. A forthcoming study by Anita Krishnakumar shows that the
Supreme Court uses substantive canons less often than most of us would have guessed. Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). As
this Article illustrates, courts at different levels of the judicial system can show quite different
frequencies of use for different canons. The jurisdiction canon is heavily used in the lower courts
but plays a smaller role in the Supreme Court. Other canons show the opposite pattern. See
Bruhl, supra note 18, at 554-55.
121. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001) (referring to "[t]he modern
concept of binding precedent-where a single opinion sets the course on a particular point of law
and must be followed by courts at the same level and lower within a pyramidal judicial
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makes law for the district courts in that circuit and the court of
appeals itself unless the en banc court overrules it.122 Further, stare
decisis is said to protect statutory-interpretative precedents with even
greater than usual force, because, unlike constitutional precedents,
they can be corrected by Congress. 123
Nonetheless, a precedent-based defense of the jurisdiction
canon is subject to two important counterarguments. The first
counterargument holds that a canon, and interpretive methodology
more generally, is not the sort of thing that can enjoy precedential
effect as a formal matter. The second counterargument assumes that
the jurisdiction canon could have precedential force (either formally or
in the looser sense that settled practices presumptively ought to be
honored) but nonetheless holds that the canon does not deserve much
protection because abrogating it would neither upset private reliance
interests, nor frustrate congressional expectations, nor unsettle the
judicial system. The following Subsections elaborate on these points
and conclude that history and precedent can provide at best modest
support for the canon.
a. Canons as Precedents
Suppose a court rules in a case (call it case Q that a particular
jurisdictional statute S does not provide jurisdiction over a certain
dispute D. Along the way to that outcome, the court cites several
considerations in support of its interpretation of the jurisdictional
statute, including the jurisdiction canon. "Our reading of the statute's
text is reinforced and confirmed," we could imagine the court writing,
"by the rule that statutes conferring subject-matter jurisdiction are to
be narrowly construed."
Which aspects of case C enjoy precedential effect? Surely such
effect attaches at least to the result that statute S does not confer
jurisdiction over dispute D and the category of disputes that are
indistinguishable from D. (Whether a particular dispute fits within
that category may well be debatable, of course, but that is always part
of the ordinary process of applying and distinguishing precedent.)

hierarchy"); see also Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683-84 (1986)
("In interpretive arenas below the Supreme Court, one good quote [from the Supreme Court] is
worth a hundred clever analyses of the holding.").
122. Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J.
787, 794-804 (2012); see also John B. Oakley, Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals: An
Endangered or Invasive Species?, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 123, 125-29 (2006) (discussing the
development of today's strict "peremptory" law of the circuit).
123. Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2403 (2015).
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Whether other aspects of case C, such as the narrow-construction
canon, have precedential status is far less clear.
One initial complication is that the canon was presented, in the
hypothetical above, as one aspect of the rationale supporting the
outcome, but the canon was not the only consideration. In this respect
the hypothetical is realistic, as any single interpretive source is
usually just one part of the justification for a result. 124 Indeed, the
leading Supreme Court invocations of the jurisdiction canon could
reasonably be characterized as cases in which use of the canon was
unnecessary (though this did not stop those cases from being widely
cited as sources for the canon). 125
There is a second, deeper problem. Suppose the hypothetical
were modified so that the canon represented the decisive reason for
the outcome in case C. Even so, it is not at all clear that the canon
would therefore achieve precedential status for all disputes involving
jurisdictional statutes or even all disputes arising under statute S.
That is because interpretive methodology presents a difficult and
disputed question about the proper "scope" of precedent. 126 In part the
uncertainty can be laid at the feet of the age-old dispute over how
broadly to define a case's holding and how much of the court's
reasoning becomes transferable binding law as opposed to non-binding
dicta. But the canons of interpretation arguably present a special case
within that debate. Indeed, the question of interpretive methodology's
legal status has attracted enough scholarly attention of late to form its
own subcategory of jurisprudential inquiry.127 Although the normative
question of how methodology should be treated is a complex one, there
is something approaching a conventional wisdom within the field of
legislation that questions of methodology generally do not, as a
descriptive matter, enjoy ordinary precedential status in federal
practice, especially not in the Supreme Court. 128
124. Even the strongest supporters of the canons recognize that canons are not rigid rules
that, taken individually, conclusively demonstrate meaning. Rather, different canons and other
indications of meaning need to be synthesized and reconciled through sound judgment. See
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 51,

59-62 (2012).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 85-92.
126. See Randy Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 222-23 (2014)
(discussing whether matters of interpretive methodology fall within the binding portion of a prior
decision).
127. See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1079 (2017); Gluck, supra note 16, at 1907-18, 1968-90; Jennifer M. Bandy, Note,
InterpretiveFreedom:A Necessary Component of Article III Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651 (2011).
128. See, e.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872-84 (2008) (explaining that the Supreme
Court does not give decisions about interpretive methodology ordinary binding effect); Abbe R.
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For my own part, I believe that the precedential effect of the
canons has generally been underestimated. I think this has happened
for two reasons. First, an assessment of whether the canons are
binding needs to take into account the nature of the canons as nonconclusive contributors to meaning. This topic requires further
development in future work, 129 but let us suppose that being binding,
for a canon, just means that the canon is a mandatory contributor to
the resolution of an interpretive problem when the conditions for its
applicability are satisfied. 130 Second, scholars' low estimate of the
canons' force is also the result of the typical focus on the U.S. Supreme
Court, which is indeed cavalier about disregarding interpretive rules
(or any other rules) when they would be inconvenient.
When one looks to the lower courts, some glimmers of binding
force come into view. To be sure, one rarely sees the matter of
methodological stare decisis directly debated, because interpretive
methodology tends to be implicit and unnoticed. Nonetheless, lower
courts do sometimes speak as if the canons were binding on them in
the sense that they are non-optional inputs when their triggering
criteria are satisfied. 131 That is, the courts apply the canons and give
them weight because a higher court, or prior precedent from the same
court, has commanded it. And this is true for the jurisdiction canon in
particular. In a noteworthy example, a recent decision from the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit read the Supreme Court's decision
in Dart Cherokee as establishing "binding precedent" on how to
interpret all provisions of CAFA. 132 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit
repudiated prior circuit law that had employed the narrowGluck, The States As Laboratoriesof Statutory Interpretation:Methodological Consensus and the
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010) (stating that "[mlethodological stare
decisis-the practice of giving precedential effect to judicial statements about methodology-is
generally absent from the jurisprudence of mainstream federal statutory interpretation");
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principleand the JudicialRole in Statutory Interpretation,
84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 385-89 (2005) (observing that "stare decisis effect attaches to the
interpretation that the Court gives to a statute, but the Court does not adhere to the interpretive
methods used to reach that interpretation").
129. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, What Would It Mean to Have Methodological Precedent
(and Do We Already Have It)? (Dec. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
130. I realize that referring to a canon's conditions of applicability elides some tough
questions. For any given canon, it might not be clear-or indeed, it might be hotly contestedwhether the canon must always be considered at the start of the analysis, whether the canon
takes precedence over some other source like legislative history, etc. This sort of dispute does not
mean the canon is not a mandatory contributor, just that its triggering conditions are unclear or
unsettled. The same can be true of substantive precedents, of course.
131. See Bruhl, supranote 18, at 489 n.21 (providing examples from various contexts).
132. Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Applying this binding
precedent from the Supreme Court [i.e., the Dart Cherokee case], we may no longer rely on any
presumption in favor of remand in deciding CAFA jurisdictional questions.").
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construction canon. 133 This does not necessarily mean that specific
jurisdictional outcomes will change, but the Eleventh Circuit is saying
that its interpretive regime has changed in a non-optional way.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressly
rejected an argument that Dart Cherokee's statement about
interpretive presumptions was dictum; instead, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the Supreme Court's new "instruct[ions]" abrogated prior
circuit law to the extent circuit law had applied the narrowconstruction canon to CAFA cases. 134
The lower courts' tendency to treat the canons as binding even
if they are arguably dicta in a technical sense should not really
surprise us. Despite the traditional importance of the holding-dicta
distinction, today's lower courts make little use of it.135 They tend,
instead, to look to the Supreme Court as a source of broadly applicable
rules to be followed, not a source of narrow holdings to be
distinguished.1 36
The discussion above provides some evidence of lower courts
treating the jurisdiction canon as precedential-evidence that tends to
undermine the conventional view that canons lack such status-but
the brief treatment here is not meant to be definitive. The discussion
does not attempt to establish that the courts would be correct, as a
matter of first principles, to give methodology such effect. Whether
they should do so is, as noted already, a complex and controversial
question. But for the sake of further argument, we can assume that
the jurisdiction canon does and should enjoy precedential status under
the doctrine of stare decisis (not just as a matter of traditionalist
respect for settled practices). That is, lower courts are absolutely
bound by the Supreme Court's rulings about the canon and the Court
itself must give them presumptively binding effect. As the next
Sections show, even these assumptions are probably not sufficient to
justify the canon's perpetuation.
b. Reliance
Whether the jurisdiction canon has formal precedential status
is not determinative of the question whether history justifies the

133. Id.
134. Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1182-84 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2015).
135. David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2025-26, 2032-42 (2013); Judith M. Stinson,
Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 240 (2010).
136. Neal Devins & David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
595 (2017).
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canon. Stare decisis is not absolute even in the statutory context.137 In
determining whether to reject prior law, one crucial factor-probably
the most important factor-is whether there has been reliance on the
prior law. 13 8 That is, the court being asked to overrule precedent asks
whether private parties or institutions of government have made
decisions premised on a certain state of the law and whether upsetting
those expectations would lead to unfairness or disutility. Indeed, as a
more general matter, any institution that is considering changing the
law, even in the absence of a formal doctrine of precedent, should
consider the effects of historically based expectations. (Legislatures
are not bound by stare decisis, but that does not mean they should
alter the law willy-nilly.) Therefore, whether or not one gives formal
precedential status to canons, we should consider matters such as
private reliance interests (explored in this Section), as well as
congressional expectations (taken up afterward, in Section II.A.2.c)
and judicial reliance (Section II.A.2.d).
Private reliance interests provide at most meager support for
retaining the jurisdiction canon. The situations that trigger the most
powerful reliance interests are typically situations in which parties
make investments and otherwise order their affairs based on the
existence of substantive entitlements, such as the various rights that
come along with contractual relations or the ownership of property. 139
Matters of procedure and evidence are usually different. To choose an
extreme example, people typically do not arrange their primary
conduct (buying houses, changing jobs, etc.) based on such things as
whether, in a hypothetical future lawsuit, the trial judge would be
allowed to tell the jury of his or her view of the weight of the evidence.
The matter of which court, state versus federal, might resolve a
potential future dispute is more important than that last example, but
there are a number of ways in which our system flattens differences
across courts and thereby suppresses the influence of forum
availability on primary conduct. 140 And here we are a further step
137. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978).
138. See generally Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459 (2013)
(examining the role of reliance arguments in the doctrine of stare decisis); Hillel Y. Levin, A
RelianceApproach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035 (2013) (same).
139. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Considerations in favor of stare decisis
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are

involved; the opposite is true in cases . . . involving procedural and evidentiary rules.").
140. For example, the Erie doctrine means that the substantive law applied in federal and
state court will generally be the same, at least in principle. Similarly, Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure means that the federal courts will typically exercise the same
personal jurisdiction as the state courts, so that access to federal court does not expand the
number of states in which suit could be brought.
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removed from serious reliance interests because we are not dealing
with the fate of particular established jurisdictional propositions (e.g.,
disputes of type D must be heard in state court) but instead with an
interpretive rule that might have some effect on the resolution of
unsettled jurisdictional questions.
We can find some illumination on these points in the Supreme
Court's decision in Pearson v. Callahan,14 1 which overruled a prior
decision about the manner in which courts were supposed to analyze
government officials' assertions of the defense of qualified immunity in
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Prior law had imposed a sequencing
requirement according to which courts were required first to address
whether the defendant had violated the law and, if so, whether the
law had been so clearly established at the time of the defendant's
conduct that any reasonable officer would have recognized the
illegality. 142 In overruling that requirement, the Court emphasized
that the sequencing requirement was a form of procedural rule that
did not engender serious reliance interests. 143 Moreover, in response to
the argument that change could be left to Congress, the Court
explained that the sequencing requirement was a judge-made rule
regarding how courts go about making decisions, such that the
judiciary was actually the most appropriate initiator of change. 144 In
light of those factors, the Court dispensed with the usual need to find
egregious error or unworkability before overruling precedent. 145
The reasoning of Pearson is applicable by analogy here.
Although the jurisdiction canon involves statutory interpretation, it
involves judicial methodology (i.e., procedure). And although one could
claim that the canon, like most established canons, has won
congressional blessing through acquiescence, interpretive canons are
typically not the sort of thing that Congress expressly regulates and
repudiates. 146
In sum, even if the jurisdiction canon is theoretically eligible
for precedential effect, it would be vulnerable to overruling because it
does not engender the sorts of reliance interests that provide the
strongest support for following precedent.

141. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
142. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
143. 555 U.S. at 234.
144. Id. at 242.
145. See id. at 234.
146. Cf. Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085 (2002) (arguing that Congress should take a more active role in governing the
interpretive regime).
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I should close this Section by noting an important assumption
upon which it is based. The discussion of reliance has been assuming
that settled interpretations of jurisdictional statutes-the diversity
statute requires complete diversity, limited liability companies are
treated like partnerships rather than corporations for diversity
purposes, etc.-will remain in place even if the jurisdiction canon is
abandoned. To be sure, that is not the only way to carry out a shift in
methodology: one could instead treat all prior outcomes as up for
grabs, to be considered afresh in light of the new interpretive
approach. Such an approach would threaten extreme disruption. My
assumption that courts would honor previous interpretations comports
with the way the U.S. Supreme Court has usually behaved, namely by
preserving prior holdings even when they are out of step, as a matter
of interpretive methodology, with current approaches. "Principles of
stare decisis," the Court has written, "demand respect for precedent
whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the
same." 147 In the related context of private rights of action, the
Supreme Court's approach has seriously changed from one in which
the Court freely created causes of action where necessary to achieve
Congress's regulatory objectives to one in which the Court focuses on
whether the statutory text demonstrates that Congress itself created
such a remedy.1 48 Yet the Court generally has not gone back and
overruled the prior cases that created such remedies, though some
members of the Court would read those prior cases narrowly so as not
to further expand the relief available. 149
A side effect of leaving existing interpretations in place is that
the jurisdiction canon, even if abolished, could continue to exercise
influence from beyond the grave. Courts try to make new enactments
(and new interpretations of old enactments) cohere with the existing
body of law.1 50 To the extent that the existing body of (non-CAFA)
precedents reflects a history of reading jurisdiction narrowly,
coherence-based interpretation and reasoning by analogy would tend
to push new interpretations in that same direction, canon or no.

&

147. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008); see also John R. Sand
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (refusing to overrule precedent that was
out of step with newer presumption about how to interpret limitations periods for claims against
the government).
148. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (describing the change in
approach).

149. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77-78 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
150. See Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1569-71 (2010) (describing the ubiquity of the "integrative" mode
of interpretation).
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c. CongressionalExpectations
Even if private parties are unlikely to have serious investmentbacked expectations in a rule about how to interpret jurisdictional
statutes, other actors or institutions might have relied on the canon in
ways worth protecting. One entity that might have an interest in the
continued use of the jurisdiction canon is Congress.1 51
Prior interpretations of the jurisdictional statutes provide the
status quo baseline against which Congress legislates. 15 2 Changing the
existing interpretations that Congress takes for granted when it
legislates could render some of its handiwork superfluous or even
counterproductive. But, again, the relevant question here is instead
whether Congress relies on existing interpretive methodologies and
canons, not existing interpretations, when it drafts legislation.
It is conceivable that Congress relies on canons in ways that
are worth respecting. Indeed, one potential strategy for justifying the
canons is to cast them as a coordinating regime that provides
background rules against which Congress can legislate with some
confidence about how courts will fill gaps and resolve ambiguities. 153 If
Congress knows, for example, that statutory uncertainties will be read
in favor of criminal defendants, against preemption of state law,
against extraterritorial effect, and against federal subject-matter
jurisdiction, then it should legislate with particular clarity when it
wishes to impose criminal liability, preempt state law, legislate
extraterritorially, or expand subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Congress-centered justification for the jurisdiction canon is
subject to several objections. Perhaps the most obvious objection is
that the coordination-related benefits of an interpretive regime cannot
a
generate
materialize if the canons are applied too erratically to
stable set of background expectations against which Congress can act.
Further, even if courts are reliable enough in their use of the
jurisdiction canon (which they may well be, compared to the way they
use other canons), the justificatory strategy requires that Congress
consider the jurisdiction canon when it legislates. On this matter the
evidence is mixed. A recent study by Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa
151. See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411,
454 (2010) ("Like private citizens, our legislative and executive branches of government rely on
the Supreme Court's rulings as setting the rules of the road.").
152. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 112-10, at 6-18 (2011), as reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576,
580 (providing extensive discussion of existing interpretations of jurisdictional and venue
statutes as part of the justification for why certain amendments were desirable).
153. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARv. L. REV. 26, 65-67 (1994) (discussing this potential coordinating benefit of an interpretive
regime).
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Bressman demonstrated that congressional drafters have at best
uneven awareness of many aspects of judicial interpretive practice, 154
though, to be clear, the Gluck and Bressman study did not ask the
survey participants about the jurisdiction canon in particular. At the
same time, although the jurisdiction canon is not as famous as some
canons, there is some evidence that Congress knows about the canon.
Congress has mentioned it in committee reports 15 5-and one could
read the CAFA legislative history as attempting a partial abrogation
of it.156 Those signs of awareness might not be flukes; the Judiciary
Committees and their staffs tend to include even more lawyers than
average, and it would be reasonable to suspect that those committees
think about judicial interpretive approaches more than most. 15 7 So it
is at least conceivable that Congress does rely upon the canon and
may have some expectations thwarted if the courts reject it. At the
same time, CAFA and other recent legislative efforts show that today's
Congress might prefer a more expansive approach to jurisdictional
statutes.1 5 8 It is not obvious which should carry more weight for the
modern interpreter: a possible congressional assumption that courts
engage in narrow interpretation or an apparent current congressional
preference for broad interpretation. 1 59
It is also possible that Congress has indirectly relied on the
jurisdiction canon's presumed tendency to restrict federal dockets in
154. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretationfrom the InsideAn Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 906-07, 926-29 (2013); see also Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of
Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002) (showing that
legislative decisionmaking is driven more by the need to achieve agreement than by the goal of
ensuring optimal judicial interpretation).
155. E.g., S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29 ("It is a
canon of construction that courts strictly construe their jurisdiction."). The dissenting views
accompanying the House Judiciary Committee report in favor of the proposed Fraudulent
Joinder Prevention Act of 2016 invoked the canon numerous times in arguing that the bill's
expansion of jurisdiction was contrary to principles of federalism. H.R. REP. No. 114-422, at 19,
21, 26 (2016).
156. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 43 (2005) (stating that CAFA's provisions "should be read
broadly").

157. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretationfrom the InsideAn Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 725, 752-53, 755, 792 (2014) (finding mixed support for greater emphasis on canons on the
Judiciary Committee); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 154, at 581-82 ("Of all committees, [the
Senate Judiciary Committee] is the one where staffers are most likely to be schooled in the rules
of clarity, canons of construction, and statutory interpretation.").

158. See supra Section II.C (discussing congressional preferences regarding the scope of
jurisdiction).
159. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-EstimatingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2027, 2084 (2002) (arguing that ambiguities should be interpreted to satisfy the discernible
preference of the current government rather than those from the time of enactment).
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making decisions about the size and staffing of the federal judiciary.
Potential docket impacts of altering the canon are taken up below.160
d. Judicial Familiarity
Whether or not a canon can enjoy stare decisis effect as a
formal matter, and whether or not private parties or even Congress
have relied on the canon in the strict sense, it is nonetheless worth
considering that the judiciary itself has become familiar with the
canon and highly accustomed to using it. The canon is cited in judicial
opinions hundreds of times a year. 161 If the canon were abolished,
judges would have to learn the new rule and break their old habit.
Lawyers would need to adjust, and treatises would need to be
updated. Some mistakes would occur, at least in the short term, until
the new rule became the new habit.
These sorts of switching costs are worth considering whenever
legal change is proposed, 162 but considered from the long-run
perspective they are fairly minor. Most invocations of the canon in
judicial opinions are standard boilerplate that do not involve much
thought and often do not even directly bear on the issues before the
court, 16 3 so making the switch could be accomplished by updating the
boilerplate.
In sum, even if the jurisdiction canon is law entitled to stare
decisis effect-which is itself debatable-overruling it would not be
very disruptive. It is therefore necessary to think carefully about the
canon's contemporary merits. The next several Sections consider
various virtues the canon might be thought to possess.
B. The Canon as Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw
Statutes that conflict with the Constitution are subject to
invalidation, but the Constitution can also influence the interpretation
of statutes in less drastic, but still important, ways. A general
principle of statutory interpretation is that statutes should be read,
whenever reasonably possible, so as to avoid interpretations that

160. See infra Section II.E.
161. See supra note 6.
162. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789
(2002) (discussing various costs that accompany legal transitions, including loss of certainty, the
need to learn new rules, and increased risk of error).
163. See infra Section III.A.
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would present difficult constitutional questions. 164 As a result, many
canons operate as a form of "quasi-constitutional law" 165 by expanding
the effective reach of certain constitutional provisions or principles
through presumptions that bend statutes away from the protected
territory. This Section considers whether the jurisdiction canon can be
understood, and justified, in this way.
The constitutional values potentially served by the jurisdiction
canon are respect for Article III's limits and respect for broader
principles of federalism. We have already observed the foundational
character of Article III's requirement that federal courts confine
themselves to limited categories of cases. 166 As for federalism more
broadly, Healy v. Ratta, one of the sources of the jurisdiction canon,
said that strict construction was appropriate in order to recognize "the
rightful independence of state governments" and to respect the "power
reserved to the states [under the Tenth Amendment] to provide for the
determination of controversies in their courts." 167 Federalism is a
constitutional value highly generative of interpretive canons, and so
the jurisdiction canon stands alongside a number of other federalism
canons, such as those that protect state treasuries and core state
functions from federal interference. 16 8 As the Supreme Court recently
stated in Bond v. United States, "[I]t is appropriate to refer to basic
principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve
ambiguity in a federal statute." 169
The constitutional considerations above provide some support
to the jurisdiction canon, but not overly much. At least two factors
undermine the link between constitutional values and the canon.
First, the jurisdiction canon protects state interests of a different sort
than the interests protected by other federalism canons. The
jurisdiction canon does not protect state treasuries from potentially
crippling monetary liability, as do the clear-statement rules inspired
by the Eleventh Amendment. 170 Nor does the canon protect state
authority to regulate particular subjects through substantive law, as
does the presumption against preemption. 171 Rather, the jurisdiction
canon concerns only adjudicative jurisdiction: the question of which

164.
485 U.S.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
568, 575 (1988).
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 17, at 619-29.
See supratext accompanying notes 2-3.
292 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1934) (citations and footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-64 (1991).
134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014).
See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-46 (1985).
See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
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government's courts may decide disputes that arise under substantive
law that is either state or federal regardless of which court hears the
case. And, of course, the existence of federal adjudicative jurisdiction
does not even displace state adjudicative jurisdiction, as concurrent
rather than exclusive federal jurisdiction is the normal rule. 172
Second, and more importantly, the vast majority of disputes
about the meaning of the statutes setting forth federal subject-matter
jurisdiction do not implicate any close questions of constitutional law.
The constitutional balance between federal and state adjudicative
authority is struck in Article III, which gives Congress power to confer
federal jurisdiction within various categories of cases, and the
jurisdictional statutes enacted pursuant to that authority are
generally well inside the constitutional boundary. How to identify a
corporation's principal place of business, 173 how to handle the thirtyday deadline for removal when defendants are served at different
times, 174 how to allocate the burden of proof on factual predicates for
removal17 5-all of these have been or still are important disputed
questions under the jurisdictional statutes, but none of these
questions generates constitutional worries in even the most anxious
interpreter.
A rare exception-a dispute in which the pro-jurisdiction
reading would have raised constitutional doubts-is Mesa v.
California.176 The case concerned whether the statute permitting
federal officers to remove state criminal prosecutions17 7 requires that
the federal officer assert a federal defense or whether status as a
federal officer is itself sufficient to satisfy the statute. The Court
required the assertion of a federal defense and, as part of its rationale,
said that dispensing with that requirement would raise "serious
doubt" about the statute's constitutionality under Article III.178 But
again, this makes the case unusual among jurisdictional-interpretive
disputes. In the rare case in which the interpretation of an ambiguous
jurisdictional statute raises a serious constitutional question, the
172. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-60 (1990).
173. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-96 (2010).
174. See Barbour v. Int'l Union, 640 F.3d 599 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (discussing the circuit
conflict over this issue). The split discussed in Barbour has now been settled by amendments to
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C), which allow later-served defendants to remove the suit if they can
persuade the earlier-served defendants who failed to timely remove to change their mind and
join the later removal.
175. See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of JurisdictionalProof, 59 ALA. L. REV. 409,
411 (2008).
176. 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2012).
178. 489 U.S. at 136-37.
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statute should be interpreted to avoid the questionable zone, as with
any other kind of statute presenting constitutional doubts.17 9 Yet that
hardly justifies an anti-jurisdiction canon that applies-as the
jurisdiction canon does-to every jurisdictional question, the
overwhelming majority of which do not remotely raise any
constitutional difficulties.
None of this is to say that interpretations of jurisdictional
statutes-and allocation of judicial authority more generally-cannot
implicate important policy debates, including some that draw their
force from constitutionally tinged values such as judicial restraint and
respect for state authority. Whether the jurisdiction canon is good
policy is a separate matter taken up below.18 0
C. Effectuating CongressionalPreferences
Although canons are wielded by courts, their content can
sometimes be justified with reference to congressional intent. That is,
for some canons at least, one can make a plausible case that they
generally point toward the outcome that Congress would prefer. 181 If
we think that Congress typically favors veterans' interests, then
reading an ambiguous veterans-benefits law in a pro-veteran direction
would help achieve the likely congressional goal. 182 If we think that
Congress probably does not wish to impose unexpected liabilities, then
we should read statutes not to have retroactive effects when they are
ambiguous regarding their temporal scope. 183 To be clear, it is not the
case that all substantive canons reflect, or could even be plausibly
argued to reflect, actual congressional desires. 184 Sometimes courts
create canons that favor what they think Congress should want or,

179. Although it is not our focus here, it is worth noting that a statute that abolishes or
severely restricts an established jurisdiction can raise constitutional worries, on the ground that
Congress is abridging due process or interfering with the essential function of the federal courts.
Courts require that congressional withdrawals of jurisdiction be clearly stated, especially where
constitutional claims are involved. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001); Miller v.
French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000); Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms,
and the Preservationof JudicialReview, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2000).
180. See infra Section II.E (discussing potential policy justifications for the jurisdiction
canon).
181. See generally Elhauge, supra note 159 (noting many canons that could be justified in
this way).
182. See, e.g., Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011).
183. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994) ("Because it accords with
widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a presumption against retroactivity
will generally coincide with legislative and public expectations.").
184. See generally Barrett, supra note 52 (discussing the tension between judicial canons
and congressional preferences).
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more aggressively still, canons that stand in the way of legislative
objectives that the courts think are unhealthy.1 85 But some canons at
least plausibly advance congressional aims, and the discussion here
considers whether the jurisdiction canon is one of those canons.
The courts sometimes say that the canon furthers
congressional desires. In an oft-cited passage in Healy v. Ratta, the
Supreme Court relied on a congressional "policy" of jurisdictional
restrictiveness in order to impose a "strict construction" on the thencurrent statute setting forth the jurisdictional amount. 186 Some lower
courts today continue to state that congressional intent supports a
rule of narrow jurisdiction.1 8 7
To decide if the jurisdiction canon furthers congressional aims,
we need to know what Congress wants regarding jurisdiction, which is
not easily ascertained. Any attempt to discern congressional
preferences on any topic runs into some familiar difficulties, such as
the fact that Congress is a multimember body that might lack a
cohesive intent on a question. But determining congressional intent is
unusually difficult when it comes to jurisdiction, for legislative
preferences are not as deeply rooted or well formed regarding
jurisdictional matters as they are regarding substantive policy
outcomes. Legislators tend to view jurisdiction in instrumental terms.
To take a recurring example, when members of Congress fervently
oppose some doctrine but cannot substantively change it because it is
constitutional in status (like the Supreme Court decisions restricting
school prayer or allowing abortion), they might advocate stripping the
federal courts of jurisdiction over such cases with the hope that state
courts will rule differently. 188 But such episodes do not necessarily
reveal any general view about the proper tie-breaker rule for close
questions about the scope of federal jurisdiction in the ordinary run of
cases.
Attempts to discern congressional intent when interpreting a
particular piece of legislation require a choice about the time at which

185. See infra Section II.D (considering whether the jurisdiction canon can be justified on
such grounds).

186. 292 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1934).
187. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 69 F. Supp. 3d 404, 409
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("In fact, in light of the congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction,
as well as the importance of preserving the independence of state governments, federal courts
construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability." (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
188. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of FederalJurisdiction, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 900-16 (2011) (citing examples of such efforts).
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to assess intent, 189 but in the jurisdictional context we face the timing
difficulty in an especially acute form, for Congress revisits jurisdiction
frequently, often with changed attitudes about its proper scope. In
Shamrock Oil & Gas, the Court was interpreting the 1887 amendment
to the jurisdictional statutes in which Congress did indeed hope to
restrict jurisdiction, but the jurisdictional rules being restricted in
1887 were those that had been created by the 1875 statute, which (like
other statutes of that period and the preceding decade) had the goal of
"greatly liberaliz[ing]" access to federal court. 190 So the congressional
policy revealed by jurisdictional enactments flipped in the space of a
decade. Both of those enactments, of course, were more than a
hundred years in the past, which leaves plenty of time for many
subsequent shifts.
The difficulties of discerning congressional preferences about
jurisdiction may well suggest that congressional preferences do not
provide the steadiest foundation for a substantive canon. Nonetheless,
if courts are going to continue to enlist congressional desires as a
justification for the canon, it is only current preferences that could
provide the necessary support. The jurisdiction canon might have
developed from the intent behind a particular nineteenth-century
congressional enactment, 19 1 but today the canon purports to govern a
general category of statutes enacted and amended at various times
(just like substantive canons governing criminal statutes, statutes
affecting Indian tribes, statutes raising constitutional difficulties,
federal statutes regulating matters of traditional state concern, etc.).
If a single canon is to govern a temporally dispersed category of
statutes, the relevant time period for measuring intent cannot be any
particular time of enactment. If today's canon of narrowly construing
jurisdictional statutes is to be justified by congressional preferences, it
would need to be today's congressional preferences. 192
So what is Congress's jurisdictional policy today, if there is
one? It seems that if Congress currently has any preferences
regarding the scope of federal adjudicatory jurisdiction, the desire is to
expand it. Certainly that is the lesson of CAFA, the most recent major
alteration of federal jurisdiction. CAFA was expressly intended to
expand federal jurisdiction because state courts were regarded as

189. See Elhauge, supra note 159, at 2081-84 (summarizing several arguments for using
contemporary preferences rather than enacting-period preferences).
190. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106 (1941).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
192. For the possibility that today's general canon could fracture into separate canons
governing different types of jurisdiction, see infra Sections IIG, III.E.
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inappropriate fora for interstate class actions. 193 In fact, the legislative
history expressly directs courts to read CAFA's new jurisdictional
grant broadly, that is, contrary to the traditional canon. 194 Since then,
Congress has
enacted several
modest amendments
to the
jurisdictional statutes, almost entirely in an expansionary direction. 195
The House of Representatives (but not the Senate) recently passed a
bill-the Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act-that would, if enacted,
significantly expand removal jurisdiction for diversity cases. 196 The
Act's prospects have probably brightened due to the 2016 election
results.
At the same time, one should not run too far with the idea that
Congress has a strong preference for broad jurisdiction. CAFA, the
most powerful recent statement, was a jurisdictional statute, but it
was enacted for very specific substantive reasons, namely (as
discussed more fully below) to reduce the liability exposure of
businesses. 197 It was tort reform more than just jurisdictional reform,
and for that reason it makes sense that the vote was largely along
party lines. It is worth noting that the very next statute enacted after
CAFA was the act creating jurisdiction and special procedural rules
for a federal case to be brought by the parents of Terri Schiavo, the
woman suffering in a persistent vegetative state whose sustenance
was ordered removed by a Florida state court and whose plight
attracted national media attention. 198 Surely that statute does not tell
us much about broader congressional views of federal jurisdiction,
except that jurisdiction was regarded as a tool for achieving other
ends. As those ends shift, so does jurisdictional policy.
193. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2,

§ 2,

119 Stat. 4, 5 (findings and

purpose clauses).

194. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 43 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41.
195. E.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a)-(c), 125 Stat. 284,
331 (2011) (expanding original jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction in certain intellectualproperty cases); Removal Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, 125 Stat 545 (expanding
federal-officer removal); SPEECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, § 3(a), 124 Stat 2380, 2381 (2010)
(providing jurisdiction over suits involving enforcement of foreign defamation judgments). The
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 made many minor changes,
some slightly expanding jurisdiction and others slightly curtailing it. See Arthur Hellman, The
Federal Courts Jurisdictionand Venue ClarificationAct Is Now Law, JURIST (Dec. 20, 2011, 5:00
[https:/perma.ccR339-LCT5]
http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/arthur-hellman-jvca.php
PM),
(describing the JVCA's provisions).
196. H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016); see Arthur D. Hellman, The "Fraudulent
Joinder Prevention Act of 2016": A New Standard and a New Rationale for an Old Doctrine, 17
FEDERALIST Soc'Y REV. 34 (2016) (describing the bill's provisions and purposes).
197. See infra text accompanying notes 257-258.
198. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15; see Michael P. Allen, Congress
and Terri Schiavo: A Primer on the American Constitutional Order?, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 309,
317-21 (2005) (describing the statute).
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All of this discussion of congressional desires leaves us,
frankly, without much clear guidance. CAFA demonstrates that
Congress desired to expand jurisdiction in particular ways and also to
foster expansive interpretations of that jurisdiction, but it is hard to
say how much the desires behind CAFA should be used to interpret
non-CAFA jurisdictional questions. What is clearer is that there is not
any strong, recent evidence of congressional desire in favor of the
current canon of narrow construction, apart from the fact, the
interpretation of which is most uncertain, that Congress has not tried
to repeal the canon wholesale. 199 If the jurisdiction canon is to be
justified, we probably need to look elsewhere than to congressional
desires.
D. CounteractingCongressionalPathology
The previous Section explained that some canons might be
justified on the grounds that they advance congressional preferences.
A very different, almost opposite, sort of justification is also possible:
courts might use canons that resolve ambiguities against likely
congressional preferences, either because providing Congress with an
undesired result can prod it to express its preferences more clearly or,
even more aggressively, because the courts regard Congress's likely
preferences as the products of a dysfunctional process. 200
A pathology-combatting justification for the jurisdiction canon
is conceivable. Congress, one could plausibly argue, is too inclined to
federalize things. This worry about federalization has found its
strongest expression in the context of federal criminal law, where
many observers have identified a problematic tendency of Congress to
turn everything it sees into a federal case. 201 One might see CAFA as a

199. The committee report on the proposed Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016
rejects any special presumptions against removal for cases covered by the bill, but the report
does not take a position on whether there should be presumptions against removal in cases that
do not implicate fraudulent joinder. H.R. REP. No. 114-422, at 11 & n.17 (2016). The committee
members who opposed the bill heavily relied on the canon of narrowly construing removal
statutes, arguing that the bill conflicted with this long-standing policy. See id. at 19, 21, 26.
200. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-ElicitingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2162 (2002) (arguing that courts should sometimes use canons that conflict with likely
legislative preferences in order to induce the legislature to state its preferences more clearly);
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 264-66 (1986) (arguing that courts should
favor canons that promote the broad public interest and disfavor canons that make it easier for
Congress to benefit narrow interests).
201. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE

FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 14-17 (1998) (observing that federal criminal law expands
because expansion is politically popular, not because the evidence shows the need for it).
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civil-jurisdictional manifestation of the same disease. 202 A judicially
enforced canon of narrow construction would serve to resist this
arguably unhealthy tendency.
Under conventional premises of legislative primacy, Congress's
preference for federal jurisdiction would need to be highly problematic
in order to justify such an aggressive move as establishing a canon to
thwart it. But has Congress really gone so badly astray? As for CAFA
in particular, it is not clear it should be regarded as an example of
unnecessary, much less pathological, federalization. There are
important national interests at stake in large cases with multistate
elements, and prior law did allow plaintiffs, through manipulation of
prior jurisdictional rules, to keep some of those cases of genuine
national significance out of federal court. 203 And agree or disagree with
CAFA's expansion of subject-matter jurisdiction, Congress is not
treading close to constitutional boundaries. 204 Further, and somewhat
ameliorating worries about imbalanced legislative influence, there are
institutional forces that can be expected to lobby Congress against
proposed expansions of jurisdiction: namely the federal judiciary,
which has in fact fought against expansion and in favor of curtailment
in the past. 205 For these reasons, my view is that it is too early to
declare an epidemic of pathological jurisdictional expansionism
serious enough to justify the strong medicine of a counter-canon aimed
at suppressing it.

E. The Canon as Good Policy
Congress is the primary policymaker in fields governed by
statutory law, but questions of policy present themselves for judicial
resolution when Congress leaves them open. Indeed, because there is
no administrative agency charged with implementing jurisdictional
statutes, any congressionally unresolved policy choices are left for
judicial decision, subject as always to the possibility of congressional
revisitation. A substantive canon can reflect a judicial determination
(independent of legislative preferences) that a certain outcome is

202. Cf. Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from: the 1960s Class Action Rule and the
2005 Class Action FairnessAct: "The Political Safeguards" of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1934-36 (2008) (discussing various positive and negative appraisals of
CAFA's relationship to federalism).
203. See Stephen C. Yeazell, OverhearingPart of a Conversation: Shutts as a Moment in a
Long Dialogue, 74 UMKC L. REV. 779, 780, 794-95 (2006) (presenting a critique of CAFA
according to which it does too little to federalize cases of national significance).
204. See supra Section II.B.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 232-233.
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beneficial and that the outcome's desirability is regular enough that
the policy choice can be made, not in every case afresh, but in the form
of a generally applicable interpretive presumption. Whether the
jurisdiction canon can be justified in this fashion therefore depends on
whether it promotes good outcomes. 206 Needless to say, whether the
canon has a good effect is a hard, multi-dimensional question. One
must consider what values the canon might serve and how those
benefits match up against corresponding losses on other dimensions.
The jurisdiction canon is usually justified through appeals to
the value of preserving state authority, 207 but first let us briefly deal
with another value. Restricting federal jurisdiction might be thought
to advance the goal of judicial restraint. 20 8 As the Supreme Court has
often emphasized in the related contexts of standing and justiciability,
courts should play a limited role in a democratic society, with more
authority properly residing with the more representative branches of
government. 209 Still, the goal of judicial restraint cannot by itself
justify the narrow-construction canon, as restricting federal judicial
jurisdiction generally just expands the authority of state judges.
Judicial power is exercised either way. One therefore needs to explain
why it is important to restrain federal judges in particular. In other
words, an argument based on judicial restraint naturally leads back to
an argument about federalism, particularly federalism in its judicial
dimension.
Is it valuable to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts in
order to preserve state authority? The answer depends on one's
assessment of the relative qualities of the federal and state courts and
what one thinks the federal courts are for. If, as some have argued,
the federal courts are better in important respects, if they are critically
important in certain kinds of cases, 2 10 then we ought to err on the side
of greater access, such as by reading jurisdictional statutes broadly or
at least neutrally. But of course whether the federal courts are
206. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 412 (1989) ("When interpretive norms are contested, and when neither the Constitution nor
the Congress has specified the proper norms, there is no alternative but to base the inevitably
value-laden choice among them on their role in improving or impairing governmental
performance.").

207. See, e.g., Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
208. See Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1937-39
(2008).
209. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
210. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Martin H.
Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real ConstitutionalProblem with State Judicial Selection: Due
Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1 (2014).
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better-and what criteria are appropriate for judging quality-would
make a good topic for an unending debate, for every supposed virtue of
the federal courts can be recast as a vice. Are federal courts superior
because they provide high-caliber judging that is free from local
prejudices, or are they too remote (in multiple senses) from the people
and too favorable toward the well-heeled? The answers to those
questions depend on whom one asks, as well as the era in which one
asks them.
Another policy consideration, less lofty but probably more
practically important, concerns caseload. If broad interpretations of
jurisdictional statutes would threaten to overwhelm the federal courts'
limited capacity, that provides a reason to adopt rules that tend to
restrict their jurisdiction and shrink their dockets. There are objective
facts one can consult on these points-case filings per judge, time to
disposition, and so forth-and one can compare those figures (suitably
weighted and contextualized) to the corresponding figures in the state
courts today or the federal courts of past eras. But the meaning of
those facts, once again, depends on what the federal courts are for and
which cases have a claim on their time. Are federal courts supposed to
be a small, elite body giving special treatment to special cases, or are
they meant to operate as a broadly available parallel system of
adjudication?
If we think sound policy requires reduction of federal caseloads,
we still face some tricky institutional questions about the relative
primacy of legislative versus judicial policymaking. As a general
matter, the legislature's discernable choices and policies should be
paramount in statutory domains, with the judiciary's own
assessments of policy playing a subsidiary role. But jurisdiction
arguably presents a special case. On the one hand, the risk that
judicial self-interest may assert itself militates in favor of greater
deference to legislative decisions about caseload. On the other hand, if
the proper functioning of the federal courts is threatened by docket
pressures, and if the judiciary rather than Congress is well positioned
to appreciate the threat, then judicial self-help might be warranted.
As stated in the previous Section, it seems that the judiciary has
meaningful access to the legislative process. To that extent, courts
should not aggressively assert their own preferences about jurisdiction
in the course of adjudicating disputes over the scope of the
legislature's statutes.
It is worth observing that one could fashion different policybased interpretive rules for different types of jurisdiction. One might
believe that federal-question cases, as compared to diversity cases,
have a stronger claim on federal judicial resources. If so, it is
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conceivable that one could have a narrow-construction rule for certain
categories but not others. I return to this possibility of a splintered
canon below and express some doubts about its viability.211
The discussion of policy has so far assumed that the
jurisdiction canon makes a meaningful difference to the allocation of
cases between judicial systems, such that abandoning the canon would
mean more cases in federal court. A skeptic would doubt that the
canon, like judicial rhetorical conventions generally, has much of an
effect on outcomes. And even the devout legalist recognizes that
canons are important only at the margin in the close cases that are
not clearly resolved by text or precedent. 2 12 Further, the vast majority
of disputes are settled, often very early in the proceedings, so
changing the jurisdictional rules could affect the terms on which cases
settle more than it affects how much work federal judges must do.
Still, the lower courts receive many thousands of cases, and so even if
the canon affects only a small minority of them, that could still have a
meaningful effect on federal caseloads (albeit a less meaningful effect
than, say, a decision to leave more drug prosecutions to state courts).
There are other considerations that cannot be evaluated simply
by calculating the canon's practical impacts on case allocation.
Continuing to embrace the canon-or even more so, rejecting it-has
symbolic value as a manner of expressing the system's attitudes about
the proper role of the federal and state courts. Expressive effects are
valid considerations in the policy calculus.
F. Reducing Decision Costs
Another sort of justification for the canons, also policy based
but focused inward at the judiciary itself, is that canons can act as
shortcuts that reduce the complexity of judicial decisionmaking. 213
Suppose a judge's initial examination of the most directly relevant
interpretive materials (the text, binding precedent) does not yield a
clear answer to an interpretive problem. When this happens, the judge
can always engage in further research and thinking about which
interpretation is best, an effort that might result in a slight increase
in the quality of the decision. Alternatively, the court could turn to a
211. See infra Section I.G.
212. Recall that our assumption is that abandoning the jurisdiction canon would not mean
overturning long-standing, solidly entrenched precedents such as the "complete diversity"
interpretation of the diversity statute. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
213.

See ADRIAN

VERMEULE,

JUDGING UNDER

UNCERTAINTY

179-80,

201-02

(2006);

Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial
Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 657-60 (1992).
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canon that directs the court to pick one outcome rather than another
and be done with it. This latter approach would reduce the cost of
making the decision. If courts consistently take this approach, then
litigants might be able to spend less time researching every
conceivable interpretive argument and might even be able to predict
outcomes more reliably.
The decision-simplifying potential of a substantive canon
depends on the interpretive contributions and costs associated with
the sources of meaning it would replace, and in that light the
jurisdiction canon does not seem especially valuable. True, the general
jurisdictional grants, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331's grant of federalquestion jurisdiction and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)'s grant of diversity
jurisdiction, are phrased in broad but imprecise language that leaves
many questions textually unanswered. But these jurisdictional
statutes are also so old that there is abundant precedent, which even
when not directly controlling still provides powerful analogues.
Precedent is not so plentiful for new enactments, but for those newer
statutes the statutory purposes and legislative history might be clear
enough to lessen the need for the shortcut represented by a
substantive canon. 214
If a canon's chief function is to serve as a decisionmaking
shortcut, the direction in which the canon points is only of secondary
importance. A canon governing jurisdictional statutes could point
toward either liberality or strictness as long as it does so clearly. But
because the current narrow-construction canon for jurisdiction coheres
with various federalism-protecting substantive canons and other
interpretive rules limiting judicial power, 2 15 perhaps the current canon
is a better choice than a contrary rule, from the perspective of
simplifying decisionmaking. 2 16 And because the anti-jurisdiction canon
is pretty well entrenched now, there would be some hassle involved in
switching the system over to a canon that pointed the opposite
direction. Some error and uncertainty would attend the transition
period. The prospect of such transition costs would provide some
grounds not to undertake the switch.

214. See supra text accompanying notes 193-196 (discussing recent congressional
enactments and proposals aimed at expanding federal jurisdiction).
215. See supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text (citing examples of canons that
promote federalism).
216. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory
Interpretation, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465 (2012) (explaining that the Supreme Court often
seeks to avoid interpretative approaches that will prove difficult for the lower courts to
administer).
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G. Summary of Normative Considerations
We have considered a variety of potential justifications for the
jurisdiction canon. It is now time to try to bring together the various
threads of analysis.
To begin with, it is well to remember that most questions under
the jurisdictional statutes, especially in the lower courts, have already
been settled. In considering whether the canon is justified, and on
what grounds, one should therefore think primarily about its role in
construing new and recent enactments and in resolving lingering
uncertainties in old statutes.
Several considerations that frequently support substantive
canons provide at best meager support for the jurisdiction canon. The
canon is not necessary, except rarely, to avoid close constitutional calls
or to provide a margin of safety around a constitutional boundary; in
those rare instances in which it is, one could simply rely on the more
general canon of avoiding constitutional doubts. Neither does the
jurisdiction canon advance congressional preferences in a significant
way: to the limited extent congressional preferences are discernible,
today they probably favor expansive interpretations of the close calls
in federal jurisdiction.
Precedent supplies only modest support for the canon. This is
true even setting aside questions about whether interpretive
methodology is the sort of thing that can be binding law in the formal
sense. Even if methodology can be, or already is, that sort of thing, the
jurisdiction canon is not law that generates much reliance. To the
extent there would be costs associated with abrogating the canon, they
would mostly be temporary switching costs of the sort that accompany
any shift in law (the burden of learning the new rules, updating
language in boilerplate motions, changing treatises, etc.).
Potentially the strongest support for the jurisdiction canon
comes from policy considerations of various sorts. If it is a good thing
for federal courts to exercise less rather than more authority, then the
canon is valuable. Whether one thinks that is a good thing is likely to
depend on deeper ideological commitments that are themselves the
subject of abiding disagreement. As Professor Richard Fallon
explained, the law of the federal courts contains two long-persisting
but incompatible ideologies-one Federalist and one Nationalisteach of which captures some of the truth but neither of which is able
to vanquish the other. 2 17 That sort of conflict does not make for a
217. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141,
1142-45 (1988).
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stable foundation on which to rest a canon of interpretation. Without a
solid normative consensus supporting it, the canon is vulnerable to the
forces of the moment. Caseload considerations might provide a
sturdier, less contentious policy basis for the canon, at least if we
believe all of the following: that federal caseloads would significantly
increase without the canon, that this would be a bad thing on net, and
that the courts may exercise self-help in the form of an interpretive
canon.
One might hope to reach a more definitive (if complex)
conclusion on the canon's value by disaggregating different types of
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction canon has traditionally applied to
jurisdictional statutes generally, and to removal most especially, but
one could retain the canon for some types of jurisdiction and abolish it
for others. Dart Cherokee has already moved us in this direction by
abrogating the canon in CAFA cases. Yet creating multiple and
divergent canons from one canon does not seem especially attractive.
Continuing to slice up the jurisdictional statutes into favored and
disfavored groups will add complexity and uncertainty, which would
run contrary to the coherence-promoting and cost-reducing functions
of the canons.
Different readers may evaluate the various potential
justifications differently, but my own sense is that the case for the
jurisdiction canon presents a close call. If it is close, then the outcome
may depend on how one assigns the burden of justification. For some,
substantive canons are inherently suspect, given their status as
atextual judicial creations.
Others, especially those whose
temperaments are cautious and conservative, will linger long over the
fact that the canon has been employed for many years without
consequences so notably bad as to justify the risks of upending settled
patterns of jurisprudence.

III. EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING THE JURISDICTION CANON'S PATH
Having examined the jurisdiction canon's uncertain normative
merits, we turn next to some positive matters: explaining the forces
that have been shaping the canon's path and that can be expected to
do so in the future.
The normative and positive inquiries are linked, of course. If
there are powerful normative arguments for the canon-for example, a
strong case based on stare decisis or a compelling policy rationalethen those can be expected to help the canon's standing, because at
least some courts would recognize the force of the normative
arguments. By the same token, if the precedent-based argument
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crumbles under scrutiny, Congress disavows the canon, and the canon
is terrible as a policy matter, courts should recognize that too. But
courts, like other institutions and agents, are motivated by a variety of
factors, and there is no guarantee they will follow the normatively
correct course even where there is one. And here, as we have just seen,
the normative case is itself uncertain.
The following pages will consider factors that can help to
explain and predict the federal courts' treatment of the jurisdiction
canon. For most of the Roberts Court era, the canon has faced some
structural and ideological headwinds. Some of those features remain
in place, but the canon's future is hard to predict at the moment given
that the Supreme Court is set to experience some potentially
important changes in personnel. Strange as it may seem, the
jurisdiction canon could be a subject, like abortion and the Eleventh
Amendment, regarding which the political commitments of new
appointees can make a difference.
A. Precedent and Inertia
Precedent was one consideration in the normative evaluation of
the jurisdiction canon, and precedent, along with the simple inertia of
the status quo, also figures in the positive analysis. In predicting the
canon's fate, and particularly in assessing the role of factors like
precedent in determining that fate, it is important to distinguish
between the likely actions of the Supreme Court on the one hand and
the lower federal courts on the other hand. Both types of courts play a
role in methodological change, but they play their roles differently.
The Supreme Court is unlikely to feel very constrained to
follow the narrow-construction canon if the canon is inconvenient in a
particular case or uncongenial to its preferences more generally. Even
if canons enjoy precedential effect, the Court has the power to narrow
or outright overrule its own precedents. 2 18 Further, the Court's own
pronouncements over the last decade or so-questioning the canon's
continued validity in Breuer, stating that "ordinary principles" apply
in Exxon Mobil, and calling the canon merely a "purported" rule in
Dart Cherokee219-have shown a distinct lack of commitment to the
canon.
The lower courts face a different, more constrained world. If
the Supreme Court expressly repudiates the canon, then we could

218. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 618 (1988) (listing examples of
statutory precedents that were overruled).
219. See supranotes 97-108 and accompanying text.
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expect the lower courts to follow suit. But what about in the
meantime? Can we expect the lower courts to take the lead in
overthrowing the jurisdiction canon? Through its statements
questioning and narrowing the canon, the Supreme Court has invited
lower courts and litigants to unsettle the status quo. 2 2 0 Yet there are
good reasons to expect the lower courts to be reluctant to accept that
invitation. Instead, they will mostly continue to embrace the narrowconstruction canon, except in CAFA cases (where Dart Cherokee
expressly abrogated it). The lower courts will do this, as the following
paragraphs explain, regardless of whether they regard interpretive
rules and canons as precedentially binding in the formal sense (a
matter of significant controversy, as discussed above 221).
First, if lower courts do regard canons as precedential in the
normal ways, then the canon should remain binding in non-CAFA
contexts. Although the Supreme Court in Dart Cherokee abrogated the
canon in CAFA cases and questioned whether there is a presumption
against removal in other cases, the Court expressly refrained from
repudiating the canon in non-CAFA contexts. 222 As noted above, there
are older Supreme Court cases stating such a canon, and there is
certainly plenty of circuit precedent embracing one. 2 2 3 The lower
courts lack power to overrule Supreme Court decisions even when the
Supreme Court has hinted at their vulnerability, 224 and a court of
appeals panel probably cannot overturn circuit law embracing the
canon based merely on the Supreme Court's statement that the Court
regards the question as open. 2 2 5 Therefore, the canon should persist in
non-CAFA contexts, and that is what I have observed in the initial
decisions responding to Dart Cherokee.226

220. Cf. Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and
Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 785-89 (2012)
(observing that one way the Supreme Court can initiate doctrinal change is by inviting litigants
to challenge a precedent or Congress to overrule it); Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court
Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 956, 967 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court
sometimes invites lower courts to read its precedents narrowly in order to provoke doctrinal
change).
221. See supra Section II.A.2.a.
222. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014) ("[The lower
court] relied, in part, on a purported 'presumption' against removal. We need not here decide
whether such a presumption is proper in mine-run diversity cases." (citation omitted)).
223. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
224. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
225. There are different ways to phrase the standard for overruling circuit precedent in light
of new Supreme Court cases, with some phrasings more stringent than others. See Mead, supra
note 122, at 797-98 (citing examples).
226. See, e.g., Johnson v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. CV15-00202-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL
1442644, at *2 n.2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2015) (stating that Dart Cherokee did not alter the normal
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Second, if canons are not treated as precedent, and even if the
canons are denied the force of some sort of persuasive dicta, there is
still ample reason to suppose that the jurisdiction canon will have
significant staying power in the lower courts merely by virtue of
inertia. Judges are human, after all, and we humans are creatures of
habit. Certain legal issues arise so frequently that the rules for
resolving those issues, along with the habits of mind that accompany
them, become routinized and virtually automatic. Standards of review
and other common legal frameworks are often set forth in boilerplate
language that is simply copied from one decision to the next. 2 2 7
Statements of the general principles of federal jurisdiction are also
frequently needed (in theory, jurisdiction is necessarily considered in
every case), and so jurisdictional principles naturally lend themselves
to copying from one case to the next. In fact, I have found copious
evidence of such jurisdictional boilerplate in district court decisions;
lots of judges use the same language over and over in setting forth the
basic rules of jurisdiction, including the rule that federal jurisdiction
is narrowly construed. 228 To be clear, using such boilerplate language
is not necessarily a bad practice: there is little reason for a judge (or
law clerk) to reinvent the wheel by drafting a new version of the
standard for granting summary judgment in every case, and the same
thing is true here.
The discussion above provides some reasons to expect the lower
courts largely to adhere to the jurisdiction canon despite its weakness
in the Supreme Court, but it is worth remembering that the lower
courts are a "they" rather than an "it"-and a big and diverse "they" at
that. Although most post-Dart Cherokee lower-court decisions have
tended to downplay or ignore the Supreme Court's invitations to
reconsider the canon in non-CAFA cases, some cracks in the canon's
foundations have started to appear. 229 It does not take much to further
presumption in non-CAFA cases); Madison v. U.S. Bancorp, No. C-14-4934-EMC, 2015 WL
355984, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (stating that "nothing in Dart calls into question or
undermines existing Ninth Circuit precedent that in a [non-CAFA case] the court must resolve
all ambiguity in favor of remand" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
227. See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 255-56 (2009); Brian Soucek, Copy-PastePrecedent, 13 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 153, 169 (2012).
228. To pick just one example, a number of decisions of Magistrate Judge James of the
Northern District of California contain the same or similar passages reciting basic jurisdictional
rules. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Chappell, No. C 11-4640 MEJ, 2011 WL 5150699,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Abitsch & Abitsch LLC v. Wanigatunga, No. C 11-4833 MEJ, 2011
WL 4715159, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011).
229. See, e.g., Mitchell v. City of Okmulgee, No. 15-CV-470-JHP, 2016 WL 2944667, at *1
n.1 (E.D. Okla. May 20, 2016) (applying the narrow-construction canon but noting that "the
United States Supreme Court has called this rule of construction into question"); Bruning v. City
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unsettle the law. If a few lower courts begin rejecting the canon or
some lower-court judges write separate opinions calling on the
Supreme Court to clarify its status, those actions will provide ready
fodder for petitions for certiorari and amicus briefs that, in turn,
encourage the Court to opine once more on the canon's contemporary
validity.
B. Caseload Considerations
To the extent the jurisdiction canon affects the workload of the
federal courts-narrow interpretation of jurisdictional statutes should
reduce caseloads, other things equal-it affects the judiciary's own
interests. Those caseload-related interests are conflicting, however.
On the one hand, more expansive jurisdiction has the potential to
increase judicial authority, such that one might expect a selfaggrandizing judiciary to favor a canon of broad interpretation. On the
other hand, a rule of narrow construction is attractive for a judiciary
that has an interest in limiting its workload. 230 Recall in this regard
that caseload concerns helped to get the narrow-construction canon off
the ground in the late nineteenth century. 231 Higher caseloads
threaten-or at least the federal judges believe they threaten-the
quality of Article III adjudication and the prestige of the federal
judiciary. 232 The federal judiciary has at times officially advocated
curtailment of jurisdiction and has lobbied Congress against creating
new federal claims. 233
In assessing where these contending forces for and against
jurisdiction come to rest, it is useful to remember that the federal
judiciary is not a monolith. The modern Supreme Court most certainly
of Guthrie, 101 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1145-46 (W.D. Okla. 2015) (questioning the continued vitality
of the presumption against removal jurisdiction and suggesting that the Tenth Circuit reconsider
its jurisprudence).
230. See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies,
65 DUKE L.J. 1, 63 (2015) (stating that limiting caseloads is "central to [the federal courts']
conception of [their] institutional interest"); Stephen I. Viadeck, The Increasingly "Unflagging
Obligation"- Federal JurisdictionAfter Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV. 553, 57071 (2007) (observing that docket pressures may lead lower courts to "under-interpret
jurisdictional statutes and to over-interpret doctrinal exceptions thereto").
231. See supratext accompanying notes 81-82.
232. See Jason Mazzone & Carl Emery Woock, Federalism As Docket Control, 94 N.C. L.
REV. 7, 53-69 (2015) (discussing the Judicial Conference's 1995 Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts and its emphasis on maintaining the quality of the federal judiciary by limiting
caseloads); William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the FederalJudiciary,
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 3-4 (arguing that the federal courts were meant to have a "limited
role reserved for issues where important national interests predominate").
233. See Judith Resnik, The ProgrammaticJudiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating
the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000).
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shows a strong interest in limiting the number of cases it hears. Its
jurisdiction is almost entirely discretionary, and it uses that discretion
to hear fewer cases than it used to. 2 3 4 Beyond restricting the number
of cases it hears, it uses various devices to limit and shape the precise
questions that it decides. 235 Because of the Court's discretion to limit
and control its docket, it can insulate itself from caseload pressures in
the lower courts. Broader jurisdiction merely increases the "menu"
from which the Court can choose in selecting whatever small number
of cases it wishes to decide. The courts of appeals and district courts,
by contrast, largely exercise jurisdiction that parties can invoke as a
matter of right. Given this asymmetry, the Supreme Court's caseload
need not bear any close relationship to the lower courts' caseloads; an
expansion of federal jurisdiction need not burden the Supreme Court
at all.
The analysis above suggests that the Supreme Court and the
lower courts might have somewhat different views regarding what
kind of jurisdiction canon advances their respective institutional
interests. The lower courts might prefer narrow interpretations of
jurisdictional statutes in order to prevent themselves from being
overwhelmed. The Supreme Court, while not insensitive to the plight
of its Article III colleagues below, has a countervailing interest in
broader interpretations that expand its pool of potential candidates for
the exercise of discretionary power. In fact, the courts' behavior may
reveal these divergent preferences in action. As described above, the
lower courts embrace the narrow-construction canon with a degree of
gusto that seems rather extreme given the Supreme Court's mild
encouragements; more recently, they have been a bit slow to catch on
to the Supreme Court's skepticism toward the narrow-construction
canon. 236 The existence of some foot-dragging in this context is
consistent with other research showing that lower courts tend to resist
changes in the legal status quo that have the effect of increasing their
workload. 237
The analysis of caseload considerations comes to a conclusion
similar to the conclusion reached above in connection with stare

234. The Justices were not merely passive bystanders to legislative acts reducing the
Court's mandatory docket in favor of discretionary jurisdiction. Rather, they lobbied for those
changes. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari:Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After the Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000).
235. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 683-711 (2012).
236. See supra Section II.A.1.
237. See Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901,
912-13, 934-40 (2015).
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decisis: lower courts may have grounds to preserve the narrowconstruction canon, but the Supreme Court does not necessarily
respond to the same forces.

C. Litigation Environment
The path of the law can shift one way or the other depending
on which subset of potential disputes ultimately make their way to the
courts. For example, one could expect a rule to migrate in a proplaintiff direction if the cases in which courts are called upon to apply
and further refine the rule are cases featuring the "best" plaintiffs,
that is, the plaintiffs with the strongest legal arguments or the most
compelling factual circumstances. 2 3 8 Something similar can be true of
interpretive canons: they are partly products of their environment,
with their development being helped or hindered depending on the
diet of interpretive questions the courts ingest. Although Congress
rarely seeks to dictate interpretive canons directly, 239 the laws it
enacts indirectly influence the prospects of different canons by
shaping the types of questions that will be litigated.
The nature of the jurisdictional disputes that have been coming
before the federal courts for the last decade could be expected, other
things being equal, to favor broad understandings of federal
jurisdiction. Most of the recent legislative activity in the field of
jurisdiction has been in the direction of expansion, with CAFA
representing the most significant example. 240 CAFA creates a bad
environment for the flourishing of the narrow-construction canon.
Congress intended CAFA to expand federal jurisdiction and even
directed courts to interpret the new jurisdictional provisions
broadly. 24 1 Even before Dart Cherokee, a few courts saw CAFA as
changing the normal rules of strict interpretation. 24 2 Now that the

238. See generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883
(2006) (explaining that the particularities of individual disputes can distort the process of rule
formation).

239. But cf. Linda D. Jellum, "Which Is To Be Master," the Judiciary or the Legislature?
When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 847-54 (2009)
(citing instances in which Congress has enacted various types of interpretive directions).
240. See supra Section I.C.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 193-194.
242. E.g., N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. HarborView Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-4, 581
F Supp. 2d 581, 584-85, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that courts should interpret CAFA's
exceptions narrowly because Congress intended to expand jurisdiction). A larger number of
courts disagreed and ruled that CAFA did not alter the interpretive landscape; these courts
applied the traditional rule that jurisdiction should be construed narrowly even in CAFA cases.
E.g., Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 336 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008); Miedema v.
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Supreme Court has emphasized CAFA's jurisdiction-expanding
purpose and even quoted the legislative history calling for broad
interpretation, 24 3 the playing field has shifted, at least in CAFA
cases. 244
The existence of CAFA, with its pro-jurisdiction thrust, is bad
news for the narrow-construction canon more generally, even outside
of CAFA cases. CAFA was the most important and far-reaching
amendment to the jurisdictional statutes in recent history, and, like
most important and complicated statutes, it is generating plenty of
interpretive disputes in its early years. 245 As a result, many of the
tough, unresolved jurisdictional questions reaching the courts today
stem from CAFA. The Supreme Court has already heard a few CAFA
cases, 246 but it probably is not done with them, and the lower courts
are certainly not done sorting out CAFA's complexities. 2 4 7 To be sure,
it is possible to decide CAFA cases without abrogating the narrowconstruction canon in its more general non-CAFA applications. But to
the extent that many of the novel jurisdiction-related cases will
involve CAFA or other jurisdictional expansions that may be
forthcoming, the canon will find little sustenance in the near to
medium term.
The flow of cases into the federal courts is not only a feature of
the laws Congress enacts. Strategic selection of cases by savvy
litigators and certiorari-wielding Justices plays a role too, as the next
Section explores.

Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328-30 (11th Cir. 2006); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d
1090, 1097 & n.7 (10th Cir. 2005).
243. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
244. See, e.g., Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Applying this
binding precedent from the Supreme Court [i.e., the Dart Cherokee case], we may no longer rely
on any presumption in favor of remand in deciding CAFA jurisdictional questions.").
245. See Michael D. Y. Sukenik & Adam J. Levitt, CAFA and FederalizedAmbiguity: The
Case for Discretion in the Unpredictable Class Action, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 233, 234 (2011)
("Millions of dollars in legal fees, along with a great deal of litigants' and judges' time, have been
spent trying to unravel CAFA's statutory framework and its practical meaning.").
246. In addition to deciding Dart Cherokee, the Court decided a CAFA case in each of the
previous two terms. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014)
(interpreting CAFA's "mass action" provision in the context of a case brought by a state);
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013) (applying CAFA's amount-incontroversy provision to a plaintiffs pre-certification stipulation that the proposed class will seek
less than the jurisdictional amount).
247. E.g., Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting split with Third
Circuit over interpretation of CAFA's local-event exception).
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D. JudicialIdeology and Business Interests
Is judicial decisionmaking the product of law or politics? Any
reasonably subtle observer recognizes that it is some combination of
both. 2 4 8 The relative contribution of each input depends on such
factors as the clarity of the formal legal materials, the salience of the
issue, and the nature of the court. Policy and values generally play a
greater role, and formal legal constraints a lesser role, as one moves
up the judicial hierarchy. 2 49
The usual blending of law and ideology applies to courts' use of
substantive canons and presumptions in statutory interpretation.
Although substantive canons often find inspiration in constitutional
emanations, statutory policies, or other public values external to the
judiciary, in a meaningful sense the canons are judicial inventions. 250
After all, there are lots of policies and values to choose from, but the
judiciary decides which ones are actually realized as canons and what
form the canon takes. Moreover, although certain canons eventually
become established aspects of the interpretive regime, possessed of
some law-like grip independent of the whims of any particular judge,
the nature of canons is such that individual cases often afford
significant wiggle room regarding whether to invoke a canon and how
much force to give it. In making those choices, just like other choices,
judges are influenced by their own interests and preferences-and this
is especially true on the Supreme Court, where legal constraints are
looser. 251 So, in studying the path of the jurisdiction canon, we might
ask what judges, and Justices in particular, want when it comes to
jurisdiction.
The scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction has ideological
significance along several dimensions. Jurisdiction is power, and thus
interpretations of the jurisdictional statutes affect the judicial
dimension of federalism, the principle regulating the allocation of

248. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78-92 (2008) (describing judges as
"occasional legislators"). The classic dichotomy is of course a simplification on a number of fronts.
Other factors play a role as well: the idiosyncratic experiences of individual judges, path
dependencies, sheer chance, etc. And distinguishing between law and politics is not
straightforward either.
249. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 9-10.

250. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 213, at 649 (arguing that "the canons can be
understood best as devices that were designed to serve the self-interest of their inventors-the
judiciary").
251. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 159-

79 (2009) (showing the influence of ideology in statutory interpretation); Brudney & Ditslear,
supra note 20 (showing that canon use is influenced by the Justices' policy preferences).
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Judges with a

principled commitment to the primacy of state governments, or a
principled commitment to restraints on the unelected federal
judiciary, should favor principles that tend to reduce the scope of
federal jurisdiction. Judges who are suspicious of local authority and
fear that state judges are unduly accountable will prefer the
centralization and relative insulation of the federal judiciary. But
federal jurisdiction also has political stakes in the somewhat less lofty
sense that the availability of the federal forum helps some identifiable
types of litigants and hurts others. Federal jurisdiction has always
been a tool for advancing social and economic interests-at the
Founding, during the Civil War, at Reconstruction's end, in the New
Deal 253-and so we should not be surprised to see it remain so today.
The preferred forum for any particular group shifts over time
as social circumstances and the composition of the judiciary
changes. 254 In the 1960s and 1970s, federal court was generally
regarded as the superior forum for those seeking to advance civil
rights, sue manufacturers of defective products, or pursue other
"liberal" goals. 2 5 5 In more recent times, some of those preferences have
changed. Although generalizations are perilous, today the federal
court has become the preferred venue for business defendants trying
to fight off consumer class actions, employment-discrimination cases,
and similar civil suits. 2 5 6 Businesses and their advocates therefore
naturally tend to favor laws and doctrines that expand access to that
favored federal forum. Business interests succeeded in expanding
diversity jurisdiction in 2005 through CAFA. 2 5 7 The debate over CAFA
was in part a debate about procedural values of fairness and
efficiency, but it was also thoroughly political, including in the
partisan sense. Business interests lobbied heavily for the law, and
252.

HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM xi (1953) ("The jurisdiction of courts in a federal system is an aspect of the distribution of
power between the states and the federal government.").
253. See, e.g., supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text (discussing political influences on
jurisdictional policy stemming from the Civil War and Reconstruction).
254. See PURCELL, supra note 75, at vii (explaining that "litigation strategies and patterns,
like other social phenomena, are historically specific").
255. Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle the
Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1528-29 (2005); Neuborne, supra
note 210, at 1109-10; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action FairnessAct in Perspective: The
Old and the New in Federal JurisdictionalReform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1849-50 (2008).
256. See Morrison, supra note 255, at 1529 ("[T]he general perceptions about state and
federal judges are now quite the opposite of what they once were.... [I]n general, defense
counsel look on having a federal judge in a case as a plus, whereas counsel for plaintiffs, not
surprisingly, take the opposite view.").
257. Purcell, supranote 255, at 1856-57.
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almost all congressional Republicans voted in favor; consumer groups,
environmental organizations, unions, and other traditionally leftleaning interest groups mostly opposed the law, as did most
Democrats. 258 Jurisdiction became another avenue for tort reform.
A judge's preferences regarding the extent of federal
jurisdiction can be internally conflicted, as when a judge values state
authority as a matter of constitutional principle but also prefers a
civil-liability system that protects business interests. On the Supreme
Court today, when it comes to high-stakes matters involving the civil
litigation system, the lower politics of consumers-and-employeesversus-business clash with and sometimes trump the higher principles
of federalism. In important preemption cases, for example, disputes
often pit a consumer or employee seeking to rely on plaintiff-protective
state law versus a business invoking the preemptive effect of a weaker
federal standard. 259 When the Court closely divides on these issues,
the Court's more conservative members tend to favor federal authority
and protection of business, while the more liberal members tend to
support state power and protection of plaintiffs. 260 While it would go
too far to say that principles such as federalism are mere rhetorical
devices to be cast aside when inconvenient, the driving force in many
close cases about civil litigation is the politics of whether one favors
larger and surer recoveries for consumers and employees on the one
hand or limited liability for the members of the Chamber of Commerce
on the other.
Given the political nature of disputes over jurisdiction, it is
perhaps understandable that the traditional canon of narrow
construction of jurisdictional statutes can itself become politicized.
That the jurisdiction canon is unfavorable to business interests
probably helps to explain the Supreme Court's skepticism toward the
canon over the last decade or so. The Chamber of Commerce does not
win every time, but the Roberts Court has been unusually receptive to
its interests.

26 1

A Supreme Court that is concerned about the plight of

corporate defendants in state courts can therefore be expected, in the
258. Id. at 1861-63.
259. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (considering whether the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts California rule restricting use of class arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (considering whether FDA approval of
a drug's warning label preempts a state-court jury's finding that the drug maker was liable for
inadequate warnings).

260. See generally Brooke D. Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV. 307 (2014)
(showing that the Justices on both sides of the Court frequently abandon their commitments to
federalism in cases involving civil litigation).
261. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1431, 1472 (2013).
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close cases, to favor broader federal subject-matter jurisdiction and
(whether as cause or effect) downplay the jurisdiction canon. Such a
preference for federal jurisdiction is, to be clear, wholly consistent
with the "restrictive ethos" that commentators have identified in the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in areas such as pleadings, personal
jurisdiction, arbitration, and class certification. 2 6 2 If the federal courts
are. less likely to certify classes, more likely to enforce arbitration
agreements, and otherwise more favorable to civil defendants, then
greater access to federal jurisdiction means lower odds of recovery for
plaintiffs. 263
Of course, the Court's inclinations toward business interests
depend on its membership, so one cannot be certain of the future.
President Trump will appoint at least one Justice. A Republican
president would ordinarily be expected to appoint pro-business jurists,
but it is conceivable that he might favor judicial populists or persons
with unexpected attitudes toward federal jurisdiction.
The Court does not act in a vacuum, and so it is also relevant to
the jurisdiction canon's future that the canon has attracted opponents
outside of the courts. In particular, the canon has become the target of
an interest-group campaign. In Dart Cherokee, the recent case about
removal procedure discussed above, 264 the Washington Legal
Foundation and other pro-business groups filed an amicus brief in
order to "urge the Court to strongly disavow the existence of a
presumption against removability." 265 Continuing the campaign in a
more public forum, an op-ed piece written by one of the briefs authors
stated that the case "provides the Court an ideal opportunity to end
the rule of construction whereby federal courts continue to narrowly
construe federal removal statutes against the party seeking

262. The phrase comes from A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010).
263. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particularto the General: Three Federal Rules and
the Jurisprudenceof the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1748-49 (2014).
264. Supra text accompanying notes 105-108.
265. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, International Association of Defense Counsel,
and Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24,
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) (No. 13-719), 2014 WL
2361914; see also id. at 2 ("Amici are concerned that unless the Court uses this case not only to
overturn the decision below but also to explain that the lower courts' recognition of a
presumption against removal is unfounded, many federal courts will continue to adhere to such a
presumption."). This was not the group's first run at the canon; it had (unsuccessfully) urged the
Court to repudiate the canon before. See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, 6, Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81 (2005) (No. 04712), 2005 WL 1210236.
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removal." 2 66 An amicus brief filed by an organization of defendant-side

civil litigators similarly urged the Court to repudiate the canon. 267 As
discussed above, the advocacy effort succeeded in part: the Court
expressly rejected a presumption against removal in the CAFA context
and questioned its validity more broadly. 268
The industry campaign for easy access to federal court,
managed by sophisticated repeat players, can be expected to continue.
As long as federal courts take a more restrictive approach to class
certification, demand more of plaintiffs at the pleadings stage, or
grant summary judgment more willingly than the corresponding state
courts, then business should favor broad access to federal subjectmatter jurisdiction.
E. Summary of Predictive Considerations
In light of the analysis above, what is in store for the
jurisdiction canon? Predictions are always perilous, but some
comments are possible.
First, the lower courts have noticed the partial abrogation of
the jurisdiction canon in Dart Cherokee, but they are unlikely to act
boldly to repudiate the canon in non-CAFA cases. The canon is
supported by too much precedent, which the lower courts find
powerful even if the Supreme Court does not, and whatever the
canon's legal status, it has the forces of inertia and habit behind it.
Moreover, the narrow-construction canon serves the lower courts'
interests in reducing their workload.
Second, the canon faces some serious structural headwinds at
the moment. CAFA will continue to provide a stream of opportunities
for the Supreme Court to address open questions of subject-matter
jurisdiction, and CAFA itself is hostile to the canon. Moreover,
influential business interests have turned against the canon, and

266. Rich Samp, High Court Should Not "DIG"Dart Cherokee Basin Case, FORBES (Oct. 21,
2014, 11:33 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/10/21/high-court-should-not-dig-dartcherokee-basin-case! [https://perma.cc/4VLQ-USJG].
267. Brief of DRI-The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 3, 11, Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) (No. 13-719), 2014
WL 2465971. Briefs from business groups in a few other recent cases have made similar pleas.
E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Access to Courts Initiative, Inc., and National Association of
Manufacturers in Support of Respondents at 34, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,
134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036), 2013 WL 4829339 (arguing that the "Court should repudiate" the
presumption against removal).
268. Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554 ("We need not here decide whether such a presumption
[against removal] is proper in mine-run diversity cases. It suffices to point out that no
antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA. . . .").
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these groups have tended to be successful in communicating their
message to Congress and the contemporary Supreme Court.
Third, although the jurisdiction canon faces threats, it is
possible that it will be fragmented rather than abolished. That is, it
may be that in the future we will have not one jurisdiction canon that
applies to all jurisdictional statutes but different rules that apply to
different statutes. For example, CAFA and potential future
expansions could be interpreted broadly or at least neutrally, while
older aspects of diversity jurisdiction could continue to be interpreted
narrowly; different kinds of federal-question claims might be subject
to varying rules based on the claims' perceived importance and
number. Given the dangers the canon faces, this might be the best
future for which the canon can reasonably hope.
CONCLUSION

The canon of narrowly construing jurisdictional statutes has a
century of history and thousands of citations behind it, but what lies
ahead of it is not as clear. Whether we ought to have such a canon is
debatable. The canon does not indirectly enforce the Constitution, it
probably does not reflect current congressional preferences, and
reliance interests supporting it are slight. Whether it is desirable
depends largely on a policy judgment about whether the balance
between federal and state judicial authority and workloads should
shade a bit one way or the other. That conflict is hard to resolve and
harder still to keep resolved, which means it is a shaky foundation for
a substantive canon.
However one assesses the jurisdiction canon's normative
merits, the canon faces some headwinds purely as a predictive matter.
The canon faces an environment in which many of the day's pressing
jurisdictional questions arise from a statute-CAFA-that was
expressly designed to expand federal jurisdiction. 269 Future legislative
action seems more likely to involve similar expansions rather than
curtailments of jurisdiction. Influential pro-business interest groups
are attacking the jurisdiction canon and lobbying for broader access to
the federal forum. 270 And the Supreme Court has not shown much
sympathy for the canon over the last decade. 271
The analysis of the jurisdiction canon sheds some light on
broader issues regarding the nature of interpretive methodology.

269. Supra Section III.D.
270. Supra Section III.C.
271. Supra Section II.A.1.
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First, the canon's recent history provides some data for the important
debate over whether interpretive methodology is binding law. The
lower courts' responses to the Supreme Court's decision in Dart
Cherokee provide some reason to question the prevailing view that
canons are not law-like: the lower courts treated the Supreme Court's
partial abrogation of the canon like binding precedent, and they
overruled their own prior interpretive canons in response. 272 Second,
the divergence between the lower courts' heavy use of the canon on the
one hand and the Supreme Court's sparing use and skepticism on the
other hand illustrates that statutory interpretation need not look the
same throughout our diverse judicial system. Third, the analysis
illuminates the connection between interpretive canons and legal
change. Some canons might be timeless, but others evolve with the
times, much like substantive law. That canons change with the times
does not show, as the skeptic might think, that they are meaningless.
On the contrary, canon evolution shows that canons do play a
meaningful role in legal reasoning, not just because the canons
themselves directly cause certain outcomes (though sometimes they
do, especially in lower courts), but because they reflect shifts in the
Supreme Court's attitudes and help to communicate those changing
attitudes through the judicial system. In this regard the canons can
play a more complicated role than either legalists or skeptics imagine.

272. See supraSection II.A.2.a.

